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This essay reconsiders the part played by the largest private sector banks in 
the Japanese economy during the years between the Manchurian Incident 
(1931) and the end of the Pacific War (1945). In contrast to much of 
the previous writing on prewar and wartime finance, which places the 
emphasis on the importance of the state and public policy in directing 
the actions of the financial industry, this research note gives primacy to 
the actions the banks themselves took to obtain funds and to use those 
funds productively and profitably. Drawing on the accounts presented by 
the six biggest banks in the corporate histories they have published from 
time to time, I argue that private sector bankers concentrated on trying to 
build and maintain safe and sound business, and wanted an environment 
in which business could prosper. While they complied with changes in 
political conditions and regulations and even at times aggressively pursued 
new business related to military expansion and war, and while some bank-
ers expressed strongly patriotic sentiments, a number of senior executives 
also voiced concerns that the economic controls introduced by the govern-
ment after the outbreak of war in China in 1937 were against the interests 
of a healthy financial industry, and they lamented the progressive erosion 
of the discretionary credit decision-making powers of bank managers. By 
adapting to circumstance and acting opportunistically to make the best 
of a bad situation, private sector bankers abetted the war-making of the 
Japanese state.
Keywords: banks, private sector, Big Six, finance, lending, invest-
ment, funds, prewar, wartime, New Financial Order (New Order), 
business, mergers, credit
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The role played by private sector banks in the prewar and wartime economy of Japan 
was long underestimated. Analysts of financial aspects of the economic emergence of modern 
Japan concentrated on the role of the state, particularly on the policies and guidance of the 
ministries of finance, agriculture and commerce (to 1925), and commerce and industry (after 
1925), the Bank of Japan and the quasi-governmental special banks such as the Industrial 
Bank of Japan and the Yokohama Specie Bank, and—from the late 1930s—bodies estab-
lished specifically for the purpose of economic control in time of war.1 Recent scholarship 
has widened the scope of inquiry by focusing new attention on business leaders and business 
organizations.2 Relations between government and private sector banks (and government 
leaders and private sector bankers) have been scrutinized anew, particularly in the period after 
the outbreak of war between Japan and China on 7 July 1937, as the New Financial Order 
(kin’yū shintaisei 金融新体制, or simply the New Order, shintaisei 新体制) took shape.3 
Writers such as Okazaki Tetsuji have investigated the activities of the private banks as well as 
the government in the evolution of the system of wartime financial control.4 
This new scholarship has deepened our understanding of the dynamics of prewar fi-
nance and its regulation. This research, however, has not yet produced a reappraisal of the 
commonly held view that the banks were merely objects of national policy and government 
manipulation, although it has, by showing light on the actions of a larger group of players 
than had previously been examined, outside as well as inside government, suggested that the 
possibility for such a reappraisal exists. To what extent were the private sector bankers passive 
receptacles and to what extent were they active agents, pursuing business as usual, adapting to 
changing conditions, and acting opportunistically in the interest of survival and profitability? 
A reexamination of the banks’ funding and lending activity might contain answers, or at least 
hints at answers. For the most part, our studies up to now have not gone deeply into the con-
tributions private sector banks made to Japan’s evolving modern—and in the period under 
consideration in the present essay, increasingly war-production-oriented—economy. With 
the notable exception of Ogura Shinji’s work on Mitsui corporate lending activity,5 students 
of financial history have not immersed themselves in the stories of the operations of indi-
vidual private sector banks. In some measure this may be because the records of those banks 
are proprietary, not open for inspection by outsiders, and scholars choose to put their effort 
into research in areas where materials are more accessible. Yet a great deal of information 
about the private sector banks is available, much of it in corporate histories published by the 
banks themselves, and some of it in industry periodicals. In general, the bank histories and 
the contemporary journalistic reports about banks’ activities present a picture of competitive 
organizations driven by desire to survive, to serve society and the state, and to manage funds 
in a safe and sound fashion while achieving at least modest profitability. 
The premise of this research note is that by delving into material on individual banks 
and their managers, we will be able to get an even better grasp of how the prewar and wartime 
economy worked, and when and how the relations of private sector bankers and public sec-
tor officials changed. Here I offer a preliminary examination of the six largest private sector 
banks in the years 1931–1945, based largely on these banks’ own accounts. Incorporated as 
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futsū ginkō 普通銀行, “ordinary banks,” under Japanese law, Dai-Ichi Ginkō 第一銀行, 
Mitsubishi Ginkō 三菱銀行, Mitsui Ginkō 三井銀行, Sanwa Ginkō 三和銀行, Sumitomo 
Ginkō 住友銀行, and Yasuda Ginkō 安田銀行 managed the equivalent of between about 
35 percent and about 47 percent of the national assets of Japan during these years.6 By de-
emphasizing the point of view of the central bank authorities and government ministries, I 
aim to write a variety of bottom-up history, although the “bottom” here is a group of elite 
financial institutions and not, for example, farmers, workers, and shopkeepers.
To convey the banks’ perspective, I have organized much of this essay along the lines of 
accounting for sources and uses of funds. This follows the scheme employed in most of the 
corporate histories, and reflects the view of going concerns. After treating sources and uses 
of funds, I also discuss consolidation within the banking industry, a major long-term trend 
that picked up momentum in the war years, and profitability, regarding which the banks’ 
historians write with varying degrees of candor. It should be noted at the outset of this essay 
that I am dealing with financial entities that continued in business at the time of composition 
of their coporate histories. The emphasis in those histories is, naturally enough, on their busi-
ness. Regulatory matters and relations with the government and its officials are considered 
important, as they condition the banks’ actions and contextualize the story, but ordinarily 
they are not central. 
The corporate histories on which I rely heavily here create and preserve institutional 
memories. Most of these have been in print for many years, yet they have been largely over-
looked by academic historians. To be sure, they were published as hibaihin 非売品, not for 
sale, and were intended for selective distribution by the banks to certain libraries and individ-
uals. They are not readily available. Moreover they do not disclose the banks’ conditions and 
records of operation with total transparency, and are not written in the manner of scholarly 
research reports. But precisely because they express the corporate perspective of their authors, 
and because they contain a considerable amount of valuable information about a vital seg-
ment of the economy, they should not be ignored. Adding further interest to these bank 
histories is the fact that they provide examples and images that become the basis for identity. 
The books—I regard them as autobiographies of legal persons (corporations, as Sir William 
Blackstone explained, are artificial persons7)—cover the whole of the banks’ corporate lives in 
some depth. They are carefully and systematically laid out, touching on the important areas 
of the bank’s business. This is not to say that they are uniformly comprehensive, or that they 
disclose all that we might wish to know and can be reasonably sure that the authors could re-
veal if they wanted to. Some people consequently speak disdainfully of corporate histories as 
tainted—to be taken, if at all, with a grain of salt—and probably best simply ignored. Others 
have argued that many of these corporate histories merit respectful attention.8 My own view 
is that we can profit from reading these Japanese bank histories critically. Historical writing 
should be judged solid when it is founded on reliable evidence and when it is reasonable, even 
if its interpretations may be arguable. It is not good or bad because of who funds the research 
and writing.9 
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From the Manchurian Incident to the Lugou Bridge Incident
The banks began the 1930s with a heavy burden of nonperforming loans on their books, 
and with fresh memories of depositors making runs on weak institutions, in several cases 
leading to bank failures. In this part of my essay, I will take up their strategies for recovery and 
healthy expansion between 1931 and 1937. Those years were significant for events that were 
not directly related to finance, but that had great indirect impact on the banking business as 
on many other aspects of life in Japan. On 18 September of the former year, junior Japanese 
army officers in Manchuria blew up a section of the South Manchurian Railway, fraudulently 
claimed that Chinese troops were responsible, and then launched a series of attacks that re-
sulted in Japanese forces occupying China’s three northeastern provinces Liaoning, Jilin, and 
Heilongjiang. This was the Manchurian Incident, and set the stage for the creation of the 
puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932. On 7 July 1937, fighting broke out between Japanese 
units stationed near the Lugou Bridge (Lugouqiao 盧溝橋, also known widely as the Marco 
Polo Bridge) and Chinese units in nearby Wanping after a Japanese soldier was reported 
missing. The soldier was found unharmed, but the conflict could not be contained, and this 
incident marked the beginning of the second Sino-Japanese war, which would continue until 
15 August 1945. 
The Manchurian Incident began three days before England’s abandonment of the gold 
standard. Both events loom large as conditioning factors in the big banks’ accounts of their 
actions in the early 1930s. Japan had lifted its own embargo on gold sales on 11 January 
1930, restoring the gold standard that it had abandoned in September 1917, following the 
action of the great powers that were engulfed in World War I. The timing of the Hamaguchi 
government’s return to the gold standard was of course extremely unfortunate, occurring as 
it did shortly after the New York stock market crash that signaled the beginning of the Great 
Depression. Gold sales to foreigners far exceeded the levels that policymakers had anticipated, 
severely depleting the nation’s gold reserves, and the first move by Takahashi Korekiyo 高橋
是清 as finance minister of the Inukai government that took office in December 1931 was to 
reimpose the ban on gold sales. The effects of the second abandonment of the gold standard 
and other measures taken under Takahashi would not be noticed immediately. In the short 
run, deflation persisted. In addition to harboring acute concerns raised by the gold crisis, 
trouble in Manchuria, and a stagnant economy, Japan’s bankers were haunted by the experi-
ence of the financial panic of 1927, as the banks’ histories make very clear. 
The political and social climate at the beginning of the 1930s was extremely unfavorable 
to large financial institutions, especially those associated with zaibatsu 財閥. On 9 February 
1932, former Minister of Finance Inoue Junnosuke 井上準之助—the principal architect of 
the 1930 return to the gold standard and a key figure in financial circles who mediated be-
tween officialdom and private interests—was assassinated. On 5 March 1932, Dan Takuma 
団琢磨, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Mitsui Company, was assassinated in broad 
daylight at the entrance to Mitsui Bank. On 15 May 1932, Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi 
犬養毅 and others were struck down. Mitsui Bank historians choose the katakana word 
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terorizumu テロリズム (terrorism) to characterize these attacks, and note that the targets of 
the terrorists were the political parties and the zaibatsu.10 Bankers in the 1930s had to manage 
business in such a way as to overcome the serious problems of the 1920s, but they could not 
be oblivious of the need to attend to their public image, showing concern about the good of 
society and the state and downplaying stereotypes of capitalists single-mindedly devoted to 
private gain.11
SourceS of fundS
The primary sources of funds with which the Big Six banks carried on their operations 
were capital and deposits. Capital levels of these banks changed little during the years from 
the Manchurian Incident to the end of the war.12 Deposits grew by a lot. We will focus on the 
movements of deposits. The bank historians treat deposit solicitation efforts in the context of 
competition, making frequent comparisons among the members of a peer group. All agree on 
the composition of that peer group: it is the Big Six.
Between the Manchurian Incident in September 1931 and the 26 February 1936 inci-
dent, Dai-Ichi Bank depositors added ¥280 million, or 43%, to total deposits. Bank policy 
on both deposits and extensions of credit in the early 1930s was informed by the experience 
of the financial panic of 1927. Deposits, it had been learned, could quickly disappear in a 
run, and what happened at one bank affected public sentiment about others. Loans could all 
too easily become nonperforming. Historian Tashiro Masao 田代正夫 points out that Dai-
Ichi’s management felt they needed to be wary about the inflow of deposits. From July 1931, 
the bank required branch officers to obtain the approval of the Head Office before accepting 
deposits from other financial institutions.13
DEPOSIT LEVELS OF THE SIX BIG BANKS (millions of yen)
*Compound annual growth rate. Period-to-period rates of change varied widely. For Sanwa Bank, 
formed in 12/33 by merger of the 34th, Yamaguchi, and Kōnoike banks, the calculation is for three-
and-a-half years.
Source: Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 230.
 
Mitsubishi Mitsui Daiichi Sumitomo Yasuda Sanw a
1932.6.30 616            620            648            679            607            ---
1932.12.31 640            687            703            735            664            ---
1933.6.30 705            696            769            815            730            ---
1933.12.31 661            715            787            798            740            1,025         
1934.6.30 696            759            816            827            800            1,063         
1934.12.31 722            748            852            872            807            1,077         
1935.6.30 752            759            868            886            818            1,080         
1935.12.31 730            796            913            952            832            1,114         
1936.6.30 805            824            940            970            891            1,151         
1936.12.31 810            856            972            1,017         928            1,197         
1937.6.30 903            904            1,054         1,093         1,023         1,263         
5-yr CAGR* 7.9% 7.8% 10.2% 10.0% 11.0% 5.0%
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Mitsubishi historians explain their bank’s lag in deposit gathering as a function of a 
smaller number of branches and fewer dealings in medium-sized cities with medium-sized 
companies than most of their rivals. They quote Managing Director (later President) Katō 
Takeo’s 加藤武男 remarks to the General Managers Meeting in the first half of 1936: “In 
terms of quality, our deposits compare favorably with those of other banks. But in terms of 
quantity, we still are behind the other banks. Of course we place our emphasis on quality, 
but at the same time, we need to make progress in increasing the quantity.”14 At the end of 
1936, Mitsubishi had 27 branches, Mitsui 24, Dai-Ichi 59, Sumitomo 82, Yasuda 141, and 
Sanwa 202.
Sanwa Bank opened for business on 11 December 1933. Formed by merger of three 
Osaka institutions, the 34th, Yamaguchi, and Kōnoike banks, it was bigger than any other 
bank in Japan by virtually every measure except one: it had the most offices and the largest 
amounts of deposits, loans, and securities holdings, and it was second only to Yasuda in 
capitalization.15 Company historians explain the condition and performance of Sanwa in its 
first few years largely as the results of inheritance. The parties to the merger were strongly 
committed to making it work, and began with a conciliatory spirit (yūwa no seishin 融和の
精神).16 The rationalization of management that was one of the very first objectives of the 
merger proceeded smoothly. As the house historians see it, customers appreciated that the 
management of the new bank was determined to run its business in a sound manner, and 
transferred their trust.17
Sumitomo Bank’s treatment of deposit-raising activity is linked together with its ac-
count of lending activity, and it is constructed so as to illuminate the competition among the 
Big Six. Tables in the Sumitomo history show the increasing concentration of deposits in the 
biggest banks in the decade after the Manchurian Incident.
DEPOSITS AND LOANS OF ORDINARY BANKS, 1931–1941  (millions of yen)
* Sanwa Bank figures for 1931 are pro forma, calculated by adding the figures for 34th Bank, Yamaguchi 
Bank, and Kōnoike Bank, which merged to form Sanwa in 1933. CAGR1 indicates the compound an-
nual growth rate during the five years ended 12/31/36, and CAGR2, the rate in the five years ended 
12/31/41.
Source: Deposit and loan amounts are from Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, pp. 297, 310, 311.
 
12/31/31 12/31/36 CAGR1 12/31/41 CAGR2 12/31/31 12/31/36 CAGR1 12/31/41 CAGR2
Sumitomo 667          1,017       8.8% 3,007       24.2% 414          618          8.3% 1,912       25.3%
Dai-Ichi 649          972          8.4% 2,504       20.8% 406          545          6.1% 1,564       23.5%
Yasuda 607          929          8.9% 2,881       25.4% 469          680          7.7% 1,695       20.0%
Mitsui 637          857          6.1% 1,789       15.9% 435          519          3.6% 1,155       17.3%
Mitsubishi 609          810          5.9% 2,068       20.6% 337          371          1.9% 1,148       25.3%
Big Five 3,169       4,585       7.7% --- --- 2,061       2,733       5.8% --- --- 
Sanw a* 910          1,198       5.7% 3,205       21.8% 568          533          -1.3% 1,666       25.6%
Big Six* 4,079       5,783       7.2% 15,454     21.7% 2,629       3,266       4.4% 9,140       22.9%
All Ordinary Banks 8,269       11,007     5.9% 29,776     22.0% 6,594       6,765       0.5% 15,465     18.0%
Big Five/All 38.3% 41.7% --- --- --- 31.3% 40.4% --- --- --- 
Big Six/All 49.3% 52.5% --- 51.9% --- 39.9% 48.3% --- 59.1% --- 
D e p o s i t s L o a n s
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Yasuda Bank historians note that employees’ efforts to raise deposits by making calls on 
customers and raising the level of their service were given focus by a kind of house patriotism 
movement (aikō undō 愛行運動) launched in 1930. This campaign was probably aided by 
the fact that depositors at many smaller banks were frightened by bad economic conditions, 
and needed little encouragement to withdraw their money and move it to larger institutions. 
Yasuda’s deposits began showing significant growth about a year earlier than other big banks. 
At the end of 1931, deposits of ¥607 million were up by ¥17 million from one year earlier. 
This provided increased resources for fueling the recovery that the bank’s financial results 
showed beginning in 1932.18
Interest margin (rizaya 利鞘, basically the spread between what a bank earns on its 
loans and investments, on the one hand, and what it has to pay its depositors and investors 
in its own obligations, on the other) narrowed in the course of the financial depression of the 
1920s. At the Yasuda’s General Managers Meeting in October 1932, Deputy President Mori 
Kōzō 森廣藏 addressed this problem and articulated a strategy for overcoming it: “From 
now on we will cause our deposits to increase greatly, and we will actively put these funds to 
work by making loans that are both safe and profitable. That is, we will generate profit by 
increasing the volume of our business.”19 The deposit initiative that he spoke of turned out to 
be easier than the plan to boost lending, as we shall see. Between 31 December 1931 and 31 
December 1936, deposits in the Yasuda Bank grew by ¥226 million to ¥833 million, or at an 
annual rate of 8.2%. In the same period, loans increased by ¥190 million and investments in 
securities increased by ¥110 million (¥89 million of which was accounted for by investments 
in government bonds).20
Yasuda in its prewar heyday as one of the Big Six had been created in 1923 in an unprec-
edented eleven-bank merger, and a byproduct of this great merger was that the bank’s branch 
network had a wider geographic distribution than any of the other big banks of the prewar 
period. While this offered the bank access to more potential customers, it was a disadvantage 
at the same time. Competition with small regional banks in the countryside required the bank 
to pay higher interest rates on deposits in branches outside Tokyo and Osaka, and meant that 
Yasuda’s interest expense on earning assets was the highest in its peer group.21 In 1935, a stra-
tegic planning section (kikakugakari 企画係) was established within Business Department 
I. Using newly available macroeconomic information (about government spending financed 
by deficit-covering bonds, for example) and drawing on the record of the bank’s own perfor-
mance in recent years, it set the first systematic bankwide targets for deposit growth, based 
on 1935 year-end balance sheet figures. Yasuda aimed to add an additional ¥200 million in 
deposits (in practice the cheapest source of funds for banks) by 31 March 1938.22 
The concentration of capital and deposits in the hands of the biggest banks in the 1920s 
and 1930s has often been remarked. Such a trend was by no means unique to Japan. “In 
tougher times, clients tend to gravitate to the bigger firms,” the noted United States financial 
services industry analyst Raphael Soifer of Brown Brothers Harriman once commented to a 
reporter for The New York Times, summing up developments of a turbulent year.23 Investors 
and depositors generally prefer to reduce their exposure to risk and to find safe havens for 
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their money, when market conditions turn down, and very often they equate size with stabil-
ity and strength. The impetus toward concentration does not come solely from above—from 
government policy or the strategic plans of the biggest companies. It reflects the will of people 
from below as well.
uSeS of fundS 
Loans 
Because so many loans to manufacturing and commercial enterprises had become non-
current in the financial depression of the 1920s, bankers had suffered through years of dif-
ficult workout situations. By the 1930s, Japanese bankers had become very cautious about 
making new credit available. But from 1932, in part because the reflation policies of Minister 
of Finance Takahashi Korekiyo stimulated a recovery, manufacturing production gradually 
began to grow more active.24 Output in all manufacturing industries rose 2.4 times between 
1931 and 1936, and benefiting from a quickening of demand after the Manchurian Incident, 
output of the heavy industry and chemical industry sector grew 3.4 times.
Dai-Ichi’s borrowers took advantage of a recovering economy to repay old loans, reduc-
ing the level of loans, as a percent of total assets, to 32% from 42%.25 From 1933 to 1934, 
Dai-Ichi stiffened credit standards and required branch officers to obtain Head Office ap-
proval before making any loan. The combination of tougher credit standards and lower de-
mand for loans cut into profitability. By 1936, President Akashi Teruo 明石照男 was talking 
about a strategic change in lending practice. The bank should think about making amortizing 
loans to creditworthy manufacturing enterprises for long-term purposes, he suggested, in ad-
dition to the short-term commercial loans it had traditionally made. It was difficult for the 
bank to make money on the old type of loans, and margins on longer-term financings would 
be better.26
Loan volume at Mitsubishi Bank dropped between 1932 and the middle of 1934, 
reaching the level of 1927–28 in the latter year. Corporate historians observe that this was 
due partly to low interest rates—or put the other way around, it was because the market’s ap-
petite for corporate obligations was strong. Companies took advantage of these conditions to 
raise funds by issuing new bonds. Corporate treasurers used the proceeds of their debt issues 
to repay the banks that had lent them funds earlier at higher interest rates. Bankers worried 
about finding new earning assets, but they were relieved to be able to collect payment on 
many past-due loans that they had extended in the recession of the twenties.27 
Beginning in the latter half of 1934, demand for bank loans picked up again. Especially 
notable as borrowers were the machine tool, chemical, mining, and cotton spinning indus-
tries. Loans also were made to public bodies that began to engage in various new kinds of 
works as the economic recovery took effect.28 The writers of the Mitsubishi story do not name 
clients here. They present aggregated statistics and categories, but not companies’ or individu-
als’ identities.
Mitsui continued to focus its credit business on large corporate borrowers. The bank’s 
historians illustrate this with a table showing large wholesale loans versus all loans in the years 
1930–1933:
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LOANS TOTALING 10 MILLION OR MORE (millions of yen and percent)
As of
31 December
Number of
Borrowers
Amount Outstanding
to Big Borrowers (A)
Amount Outstanding
to All Borrowers (B)
A ÷ B
(Percent)
1930 73 314 436 72
1931 70 289 434 66
1932 72 291 429 67
1933 67 271 409 66
Source: Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 421. 
Loan demand increased from late 1931, and it grew sharply beginning in 1936. From 1921 
through 1935, total Mitsui Bank loans had ranged between ¥300 million and ¥500 million. 
In 1936 they topped ¥500 million, and the bank added about ¥100 million a year in each of 
the next three years. In 1940, the total exceeded ¥1 billion. The bank’s historians point out 
that this growth was not as fast as that at other major private sector banks, primarily because 
Mitsui had few branches and consequently had a harder time than its rivals in attracting new 
deposits (the lowest cost source of funds for a bank).29
Mitsui’s narrative offers a glimpse into continental expansion in the years between the 
Manchurian Incident and the beginning of the Sino-Japanese War. Bank Chairman Kikumoto 
Naojirō’s 菊本直次郎 two trips to the Asian mainland in 1935 receive notice. On the sec-
ond, in October, he traveled to Shanghai to observe conditions in the bank’s branch there. 
Business was thriving, and future growth prospects prompted Mitsui to begin construction 
of a new office building. Finished in 1938, the Shanghai Branch would occupy the only 
piece of land that the bank owned, rather than leased, outside Japan, in prewar years.30 The 
bank’s historians make a point of contrasting their former chief executive’s negative opinion 
about Manchukuo (see below) with the institution’s positive view of China. But they forgo 
discussing the nature of the opportunities and risks in the two places, or the implications of 
the chairman’s interest. This passage might have been the place to analyze how the activities 
of the bank fit into the overall pattern of Japanese expansion on the continent and the bank’s 
own involvement outside the homeland with Mitsui-owned companies, Mitsui-related com-
panies, and non-Mitsui enterprises. 
Yasuda established credit evaluation, or credit analysis, as an independent department 
(shinsaka 審査課) in 1929 in anticipation of Japan’s lifting of the gold embargo. Two years 
later when results were improving and it seemed that the bank had overcome the effects of 
the financial panic of 1927, the bank abolished this department and set up two new business 
departments with separate territorial responsibilities.31 Though the functions of research and 
evaluation of creditworthiness did not change materially, Fuji historians see a shift in the 
bank’s mindset, illustrated in the statement of Deputy President Mori: “The name ‘business 
department’ is founded on the idea that we will stress promotion of business, and we have 
made new staff assignments with this in mind.”32 In other words, the emphasis was no longer 
on cautious risk management. The bank’s posture had become aggressive and expansive.
At Yasuda as elsewhere demand for commercial and industrial loans was weak in the 
early 1930s, and the aggressive posture that Mori outlined to general managers in 1932 
could not quickly be translated into a higher level of assets earning interest at profitable 
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margins. Needing to earn enough to pay interest on the deposits and to make a profit for 
shareholders, but finding few opportunities to expand corporate lending business, the bank 
had no choice but to increase its investments in securities, both government and corporate 
securities.33 Within Yasuda Bank, there were debates about lending policy. Should the bank 
go on with its traditional practice of focusing mainly on commercial enterprises? Or should 
it lend more to industrial companies? The advocates of an aggressive strategy of going along 
with political trends and lending to heavy industry centered on young employees; there were 
others who wanted to hold carefully to traditional business emphases. In 1936, Takemura 
Kichiemon 竹村吉右衛門 was appointed general manager of the loan department in the 
business development division. He took the position that the bank should concentrate on 
emerging industries.34
As Japan moved into wartime mode, Yasuda’s balance sheet began to change also. The 
annual increase in loans by Yasuda Bank had been several tens of millions of yen between 
1931 and 1935. In 1936 and 1937, it rose above ¥100 million a year. At the Branch General 
Managers Meeting of April 1937, an unnamed senior executive said, “Work related to mili-
tary expenditure increases with the expansion of the budget, and for that reason we have 
to prepare raw materials. Moreover, from the end of 1936, since our need to purchase raw 
materials has arisen at a time when commodity prices have tended to escalate rapidly, whether 
the materials are demanded by the military or by some other sector, working capital needs 
have risen. Additionally, with the increase in turnover of commercial goods, the numbers of 
those engaged in commerce has grown.” In this situation, demand for funding that could be 
applied to speculation in stocks or commodities also increased, and Yasuda’s branch managers 
were warned that they must strictly adhere to a “policy of ensuring that loans are made [only] 
to customers whose creditworthiness and assets are sound.”35 
Investments in securities 
Military spending by the Japanese state jumped from the time of the Manchurian 
Incident. In fiscal year 1931, it had been ¥461 million. In 1932, it was ¥710 million (up 54% 
from the previous year); in 1933, ¥853 million (up another 20%); in 1934, ¥951 million (up 
11%); in 1935, ¥1.042 billion (up 10%). Government debt issues between November 1932 
and December 1935 totaled ¥3.379 billion. Over 80% of the new bonds were underwritten 
by the Bank of Japan, and many of these were marketed to the ordinary banks. At the end of 
1932, all ordinary banks in Japan held ¥1.188 billion in government bonds; three years later 
the amount had nearly doubled to ¥2.25 billion. 
In the early 1930s, when demand for new bank loans to businesses was weak, Dai-Ichi’s 
treasury managers put increased deposits to work by investing in securities. Securities hold-
ings rose ¥176 million, or by 58%. The government and the Bank of Japan were keeping 
interest rates low at this time, and these balance sheet movements did not enable the bank to 
escape from shrinking margins.36 
Mitsubishi Bank managers, too, allocated more of their funding resources to invest-
ment in national and corporate bonds. The total of securities held by the bank increased 
from ¥282 million at the end of June 1932 to ¥404 million five years later. Proportions of 
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public and private debt in the bank’s portfolio changed dramatically over this period. At 30 
June 1932, 28% of the bank’s securities holdings were national bonds, 52% corporate bonds, 
and the remaining 20% equities. At 30 June 1937, government bonds made up 54% of the 
portfolio, and corporate bonds had fallen to 33%. This reflected the increased debt issuance 
by the government, largely to fund growing expenditures on the military, as well as changes 
in the marketplace for corporate debt. Mitsubishi’s historians note that several of the corpo-
rations that were successfully funding themselves in the bond market in these years were in-
volved in the development of Manchuria and Korea: the South Manchurian Railway, Chōsen 
Shokusan, the Oriental Development Company, Manchuria Electric, Manchuria Telegraph 
and Telephone, Shōwa Seikō Sho, and the Manchukuo Northern Manchurian Railway are 
especially notable.37 
Mitsui’s securities business included underwriting of entities involved in Japanese ex-
pansion. One instance was the bank’s leadership of a syndicate that underwrote government 
bonds issued by Manchukuo and corporate bonds issued by the South Manchurian Railroad. 
In April 1935, Bank Chairman Kikumoto led a party of bankers from this syndicate on a one-
month tour of Manchuria. There had been vociferous theorizing within military circles about 
not allowing the zaibatsu to get involved in Manchuria, following the establishment of the 
state of Manchukuo. To win the goodwill of the Japanese financial world, and to overcome 
the harm that might have been done by anticapitalist militarists, Kikumoto and his group 
had been invited to visit. In the event, firsthand experience did not lead Kikumoto to a favor-
able view of business prospects in Japan’s client state. When he returned home, he reported to 
leaders of Mitsui Company that it was not a good time to invest in Manchukuo.38
Yasuda’s securities investment was mostly in government debt. Its holdings of gov-
ernment securities rose from ¥95 million to ¥167 million during the three years ended 31 
December 1935.39 The bank did develop fee-producing business related to corporate se-
curities, taking, for example, the job of trustee for corporate debt issues by Nihon Denki 
Kōgyō and Asano Shipbuilding in 1935.40 Elected chairman of the board of directors of the 
Tokyo Clearing House in March 1935, Mori Kōzō presided over the meeting of the National 
Federation of Clearing Houses (Zenkoku Tegata Kōkanjo Rengō Kai 全国手形交換所連合
会) the next month. At the time this was the only national banking association in Japan. The 
Yasuda Bank chief addressed the members, and expressed some concern about the increase 
in military spending: “A country’s military spending must be planned so as to be consistent 
with its national policy, yet at the same time I think that it always must be kept in line with 
the wealth producing capability of the people (kokumin no furyoku 国民の富力).” Turning 
to the need to prevent inflation, he stressed the need to maintain trust in the currency, and 
suggested, “The most important thing is to limit the volume of currency, and the second most 
important is to allow the workings of capital to flourish.” He warned against potential harm 
that might be caused by a controlled economy, “The government seems to think it can use 
its power at will and even to try its hand at running privately owned facilities. If it restrains 
the activity of private capital, and if it adopts policies that squeeze off most of the profits that 
are earned, then it will kill the usefulness of capital, and as a consequence people will lose 
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confidence in the currency.” Fuji Bank’s historians, citing a newspaper account characterizing 
Mori’s speech as a blow against militarism and the notion of a control economy, comment 
that it evoked widespread approval at the time.41 
The Sino-Japanese War to Pearl Harbor
War with China made economic and financial demands on Japan that exceeded the 
capacity of the system that was in place when the fighting began in July 1937. The govern-
ment, spurred on by the military, did not have the patience to wait and see if market forces 
would create new funding vehicles. Instead it began imposing new regulations, most notably 
the Emergency Funds Adjustment Law (10 September 1937); the National Mobilization Law 
(1 April 1938); the Decree on Price Controls (18 October 1939); and the Decree on Funds 
Management by Banks and Others (19 October 1940). At the end of 1940 the principles for 
establishing a “New Order” (shintaisei) for Japan’s economy were announced.42 “The ‘New 
Order’ was one that tried to restructure fundamentally the free market economic organization 
that Japan had had up to that time, and remake it by giving precedence to the public good 
and by introducing a planned economy.”43 More and more goods fell into the category of 
controlled goods, and their production and distribution was steered to controlled companies 
(tōsei gaisha 統制会社) or associations (tōsei kumiai 統制組合). The old wholesalers (toiya 
問屋) and retailers were brought under these controlled organizations, and small and me-
dium-sized businesses were subjected to great changes in the basis of their operations.
Despite the advance of regulation, the historians of the six biggest banks agree that until 
1940, much was left to the discretion of bank managers. Then the rules began to get more 
concrete. In the second half of 1940, the government required banks with over ¥50 million in 
deposits (that is, fifty-nine of the ordinary banks) to submit estimates of the expected increase 
in deposits, loans, and securities holdings. The seven largest banks consulted together, and 
proposed three points to the government: (1) they would add to their holdings of government 
securities by 30% of the amount they collected in new deposits; (2) they would add to their 
holdings of corporate debt by 20% of the amount they collected in new deposits; and (3) they 
would limit the total of new loans to 50% of the amount they collected in new deposits.44 
SourceS of fundS 
Mitsubishi Bank raised its level of deposits after the war in China began, as did other 
banks. This was a product of deliberate effort, and also of the economic recovery stimulated 
by heavy government spending. The bank’s historians select some comparative statistics that 
suggest much about the trend of the time, after reminding readers that Mitsubishi was dis-
advantaged in deposit generation by its relatively small number of branches. A few of the 
numbers are laid out in the following table:
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DEPOSITS OF ORDINARY BANKS (millions of yen)
As of
31 December 
Mitsu-
bishi
Dai-
Ichi Mitsui Yasuda Sumitomo Sanwa
Dai-
Hyaku
All Ordinary
Banks
1937    932    1,120    945    1,089    1,152    1,340    788 12,352 
1941   2,067    2,504    1,789    2,880    3,007    3,204    1,698 29,406 
Compound annual
growth rate 22.0% 22.3% 17.3% 27.5% 27.1% 24.4% 21.2% 24.2%
Source: Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 277.
A new chairman, Katō Takeo, addressed the Mitsubishi general managers in the second 
half of 1938. He noted that the bank had passed the million yen mark in deposits, but ex-
pressed some concern about the quality. Time deposits were not increasing as fast as demand 
deposits, which are more volatile and therefore less preferable. He drew a comparison with 
his bank’s peers, and exhorted his managers to compete, promising a new strategy that would 
help them in the struggle against their rivals: “I want you to make even greater efforts, and 
to fight to make our deposits inferior to none of the other five big banks, needless to say in 
quality, but also in quantity. The point on which our bank has a relative weakness, compared 
to the other banks, is clearly that we have a small number of branches. Our policy from now 
on will be to work ceaselessly to increase the number of branches.”45 
The banker-historians observe that even though the Japanese economy passed 1938 and 
the beginning of 1939 in relatively good shape, the leaders of Mitsubishi were aware of un-
certainty and the dangers all around, and “constantly kept in mind making the operation of 
our bank safe and sound.” They excerpt a resigned, weary sounding statement from Chairman 
Katō’s remarks to the Branch General Managers Meeting of May 1939: “At the Financial 
Roundtable Conference that I attended there was an exchange of opinions about the situation 
in Europe and the road ahead in the Sino-Japanese Incident, and how we should deal with 
these. But in the end no one could forecast what will happen, and I could hear nothing but 
expressions of the view that we have to make the best of things as they actually are (genjō zen­
sho teido no iken 現状善処程度ノ意見).”46 We might speculate that the postwar historians 
were happy to be able to cite these words, conspicuously lacking in militaristic or imperialistic 
enthusiasm, from their former chief executive. We can only assume that the quote accurately 
represents the whole of Katō’s speech and his thinking at the time. At the same 1939 meeting 
of Mitsubishi branch officers, Managing Director Takagi Kenkichi 高木健吉 voiced misgiv-
ings about the direction of change. “It is extremely difficult to make judgments about present 
economic circumstances using the concepts that applied to the free economy of the past (jūrai 
no jiyū keizai 従来の自由経済),” he said. “And even for the authorities it is hard to predict 
the future course of things. Fortunately in the period from August 1937 though May 1939 
our national power has increased and we have built up a considerable supply of all kinds of 
stocks. Yet even if there is not some sudden great upheaval, my worries about how long we 
can continue the present state of affairs are truly almost unbearable.”47 
Critical readers today may be struck by the emphasis on business competition and the 
paucity of discussions of the larger issues of the era, such as continental war and the connec-
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tion between Japan’s foreign policy and its economic difficulties. The bank’s historians have 
touched on these, to be sure, but lightly, without any elaborated analysis or explicit attribu-
tion of praise and blame. What Katō did not treat in his remarks, and what Mitsubishi’s his-
torians writing nearly a decade after the war did not directly address, is what Deutsche Bank 
historians in the 1990s dealt with repeatedly as they composed their account of the 1930s 
and early ’40s: How did the bank’s actions comport with national policy objectives, and what 
were the larger social and political consequences of the bank’s decisions? The Mitsubishi ac-
count makes it clear that the bank complied with government policy. It is apparent, though 
it is not stated in so many words, that the bank made credit available to companies (many of 
them Mitsubishi Group concerns) doing war-effort related business, and that this business 
was profitable for the bank for several years.
Even before July 1937, Sanwa’s Head Office Planning Department already had been 
urging branches to drum up more deposits, and after conflict in China began, the bank 
vigorously pursued deposit growth as a way of cooperating with state policy. Its efforts were 
strengthened and made more systematic after the Peoples Savings Movement was launched 
nationwide in 1938.48 When the government implemented the Peoples Savings Union Law 
in June 1941 and gave ordinary banks permission to offer small savings account (chochiku 
yokin 貯蓄預金) services, “Sanwa took the opportunity and developed a great educational 
campaign, and cooperated with the national policy of increasing savings.”49 
With demand for loans by heavy industry rising as more arms were built, there was 
pressure on Yasuda to draw on its branch network to raise deposits from all over Japan and 
then to concentrate the bank’s lending on the few areas where heavy industry’s plants were 
located. Among the branch general managers, some spoke up for raising funds by borrowing 
from the Bank of Japan, using Yasuda’s holdings of government bonds as collateral. This was 
legal, and fairly common at other banks. Deputy President Mori rejected this idea, however, 
saying, “Our bank must never forget the principles of safety and soundness in dealing with 
our depositors. To make loans with borrowed funds is to forget where we have come from.”50 
His reluctance to put borrowed funds (as distinguished from funds raised by taking deposits) 
at risk seems rather quaint by current banking standards, but Mori’s conservatism was not un-
common in its day.51 He was not afraid to use deposits as the funding base for sound lending, 
but he did not wish to put other Yasuda borrowings at risk by using them to create loan assets, 
and he did not want to give the Bank of Japan a collateralized obligation of the bank that 
might enable it to make claims that had precedence over the claims of depositors. Mori’s re-
marks on this occasion are notable not only for the sense of fiduciary responsibility that they 
evidence, but also because of the context. The historians of Fuji bank do not explicitly say that 
Yasuda’s chief operating officer insisted on sticking to sound banking practice at a time when 
many others were letting their judgment be affected by the enthusiasms of Japanese national 
expansion, but that is the implication of the quotation.
Yasuda reached the goal of raising ¥1 billion in deposits in October 1937 (the target 
date had been 31 March 1938). Immediately the goal was reset to ¥1.2 billion, then, when 
that level was attained at the end of September 1938, it was raised again to ¥1.5 billion. In 
June 1939, it was revised to ¥2.0 billion.52 In 1940 Yasuda Bank commemorated its sixtieth 
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anniversary. Having just attained its most recent goal for deposits of ¥2 billion, it could boast 
of having taken ¥1.5 billion in new deposits in the five years since 1935, tops among the 
six largest banks in Japan. It had increased its loans by some ¥900 million during the same 
period, and it had increased its securities holdings by about ¥500 million (of which about 
80% were government bonds). Operating profit (keijō rieki 経常利益) reached ¥30 million 
in 1940, nearly three times the level of 1935. At the ceremony celebrating the bank’s anniver-
sary, on 7 May 1940, Yūki Toyotarō 結城豊太郎, once Yasuda’s chief operating officer and 
now governor of the Bank of Japan, was the honored guest, and he made a congratulatory 
address.53 It was for this occasion that Yasuda Bank published its first bank history.
uSeS of fundS 
Loans 
The Diet enacted the Emergency Funds Adjustment Law in September 1937. Aimed at 
tightening the screws of control, the key provisions of this law (1) required banks to adjust 
lending policies to avoid the flow of funds into industries that were not critical to the situ-
ation, (2) established special preferential treatment rules for issues of shares and bonds by 
companies engaged in production of equipment and supplies for the military, and doubled 
the quasi-governmental Industrial Bank of Japan’s underwriting limits to facilitate that bank’s 
ability to supply funds to favored industries, and (3) allowed a new issuance of savings bonds 
in order to heighten the nation’s absorption of government debt. Mitsubishi Bank historians 
relegated their evaluation of the first of these provisions to a footnote, saying, “The operation 
of this law still left some room for autonomous decision, but banks’ freedom of choice as to 
which borrowers would receive credit and how much would be lent had become regulated 
by state objectives.”54 
SELECTED ASSETS OF ALL ORDINARY BANKS, 1937 (millions of yen)
Source: Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 246. 
At the Mitsubishi Bank General Managers Meeting for the second half of 1937, 
Chairman Sejimo Kiyoshi 瀬下清 laid out a new lending policy. “Two or three years ago 
Mitsubishi Mitsui Daiichi Sumitomo Yasuda Sanw a
1932.6.30 616            620            648            679            607            ---
1932.12.31 640            687            703            735            664            ---
1933.6.30 705            696            769            815            730            ---
1933.12.31 661            715            787            798            740            1,025         
1934.6.30 696            759            816            827            800            1,063         
1934.12.31 722            748            852            872            807            1,077         
1935.6.30 752            759            868            886            818            1,080         
1935.12.31 730            796            913            952            832            1,114         
1936.6.30 805            824            940            970            891            1,151         
1936.12.31 810            856            972            1,017         928            1,197         
1937.6.30 903            904            1,054         1,093         1,023         1,263         
5-yr CAGR* 7.9% 7.8% 10.2% 10.0% 11.0% 5.0%
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when the state of financial affairs in Japan was lackluster, we urged you to book more loans. 
Our efforts then can be compared to pulling up seeds. But within the last year we have finally 
begun to see a few buds sprouting. Especially quite recently we are in a situation in which 
Mitsubishi-affiliated companies and firms related to them are rapidly increasing their demand 
for funding,” he explained. “As Mitsubishi Bank, however, in accordance with the traditional 
Mitsubishi spirit, we have to hold to policies that are a little different from other ordinary 
banks. That means we must avoid going to the Bank of Japan to seek funds. Rather, as a top-
tier bank, we must be a net supplier of funds to the Bank of Japan. . . . Therefore, we will face 
the future with our traditional policies, and indeed we will add even more of the flavoring of 
austerity. We hope to do transactions that are full of promise for the future.”55 
 Overall lending patterns of the major banks and all ordinary banks can be seen in se-
lected statistics presented by the Mitsubishi writers:
LOANS OF ORDINARY BANKS (millions of yen)
As of
31 December
Mitsu-
bishi
Dai-
Ichi Mitsui Yasuda
Sumi-
tomo Sanwa
Dai-
Hyaku
All Ordinary 
Banks
1937 530 712 616 786 736 610 398 7,712
1941 1,147 1,563 1,154 1,695 1,912 1,666 911 15,142
Compound annual 
growth rate 21.3% 21.7% 17.0% 21.2% 27.0% 28.6% 23.0% 18.4%
Source: Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 278.
In the face of much uncertainty, Mitsubishi adopted cautious management policies, 
and succeeded in cultivating steady growth of deposits, loans, and securities investments. 
Chairman Katō Takeo was able to say to the general managers late in 1940, “Some other 
banks have received criticism because of their sudden tightening when there was a great deal 
of volatility in financial markets in September and October, but we must be delighted that 
our bank has had no difficulties.” The bank’s historians point out that there were almost no 
bad loans on the balance sheet at the time.56
The composition of Mitsubishi Bank’s loan portfolio changed with the times. The bank 
committed more credit to heavy industries such as metals and machinery and less to light 
industries that produced for civilian consumers. Mitsubishi historians note that by the end 
of 1941, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Mining, Asahi Glass, Nihon Kasei Kōgyō, 
Mitsubishi Rolled Steel, Nihon Light Metals, and Mitsubishi Electric had all become ma-
jor borrowers. Before the war with China began in 1937, not one of those companies had 
borrowings that amounted to as much as one percent of the bank’s total loans. In the same 
period, credit made available to several other once major customers declined or at least failed 
to grow: Mitsubishi Trading, Mitsubishi Property, Mitsubishi Paper, Mitsubishi Warehouse, 
and Kanegafuchi Spinning are enumerated. The bank’s house historians do not detail how 
much was lent to any of these borrowers, or explain what, exactly, the recipients of credit 
produced, using the proceeds of the loans. Merely by giving the list, however, they make the 
obvious concrete—Mitsubishi Bank was supporting the manufacture of armaments, as were 
other banks, and the makers of weapons who were beneficiaries of wartime financing can be 
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named.57
Mitsubishi Bank opened a number of new offices to provide credit and other banking 
services to companies producing weapons and other military supplies, and to the commu-
nities that grew up around their new manufacturing facilities. For the first time the bank 
established branches to the west of Kobe. Many affiliated manufacturing companies, includ-
ing Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Mitsubishi Mining, Mitsubishi Electric, and Nippon Kasei 
Kōgyō, had factories in the Kita Kyushu area, and the bank sited its first Kyushu branch in 
Kokura.58 
In their account of a leadership transition in the Mitsui group in 1938, Mitsui histori-
ans make a point about how broad political and military developments affected their com-
pany. The former chief operating officer of the bank, Ikeda Shigeaki, stepped down from the 
post of principal managing director of Mitsui Company (Mitsui Gōmei, the central holding 
company of the Mitsui zaibatsu) upon the introduction of new age limits for senior execu-
tives that year. He was nearly sixty-nine, and he had just spearheaded a group reform that, 
among other things, set the mandatory retirement age for all Mitsui directors at sixty. His 
successor as the chief officer of the Mitsui companies, Nanjō Kaneo 南条金雄, immediately 
published a statement that put him on record as a wholehearted supporter of the policies of 
the government. Bank historians paraphrase thus: “He made clear a plan to cooperate posi-
tively with national policy.” Nanjō decided that Mitsui should enter new areas of production 
in order to achieve this, including liquefied coal, automobiles, and aircraft.59 In a delicate 
understatement, the bank’s historians observe that Mitsui thereby lost something of its old 
strong peaceful character:
In September 1937 the Emergency Funds Adjustment Law was promulgated, and 
in October 1940 the Decree on Funds Management by Banks and Others was 
promulgated. By such means, the flow of bank loans came to be regulated, but at 
the same time, state control over corporations also was being strengthened. Thus 
our bank’s borrower list naturally began to show changes.60
MITSUI BANK LOANS TO MITSUI COMPANIES AND MITSUI-RELATED COMPANIES 
                (thousands of yen)
31 Dec 1939 31 Dec 1940 Pct Chg
Mitsui Company (Gōmei) 15,000 --- -100.0%
Mitsui Trading*  9,494 84,862 246.5%
Mitsui Mining 13,538 29,768 119.9%
  SUBTOTAL 38,032 114,630 201.4%
Tokyo Shibaura Electric 9,000 10,800 20.0%
Oji Paper 17,402 24,357 40.0%
Hokkaido Coal Mining & Shipping 1,500 5,000 233.3%
Denki Kagaku Kōgyō 1,500 3,900 160.0%
Tōyō Menka 219 703 221.0%
Kanegafuchi Boseki 44,174 41,691 -5.6%
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31 Dec 1939 31 Dec 1940 Pct Chg
Nippon Seikōsho 5,075 6,250 23.2%
Nippon Flour Milling 22,492 17,441 -22.5%
Dai Nippon Celluloid 7,296 7,382 1.2%
Onoda Cement Manufacturing 1,261 1,682 33.4%
Tōyō Kōatsu Kōgyō --- 1,340 NM
T O T A L 147,951 235,176 59.0%
Source: Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 423.
In August 1940 the Mitsui Company (Mitsui Gōmei) was merged into Mitsui Trading 
(Mitsui Bussan, today known as Mitsui & Co., Ltd.) The product of this amalgamation effec-
tively operated as a holding company for other enterprises owned by Mitsui. Under pressure 
from the authorities to raise levels of production, Mitsui & Co. got involved in the funding 
of owned or otherwise closely related entities. Mitsui Bank no longer had free discretion in 
credit decision making, and by the end of 1940, it had departed from its longstanding policy 
(and what was at the time regarded as sound banking practice) and made loan commitments 
that added up to more than the total deposits in the bank.61
Charged with allocating as many of its resources as possible to the war effort, Mitsui 
cut down the amount of credit it made available to electric utilities and electric railways, in-
dustries that the bank had long been bullish in supporting. As a percent of total loans, credits 
to electric power companies fell to 10.5% at the end of 1938 from 22.7% eight years earlier; 
credits to electric railways dropped to 3.7% of total loans at 31 December 1940, from 10.1% 
at their prewar peak at the end of 1934.62 The Nihon Hassōden Kaisha was created to take 
complete control of electric power production, and the state mandated that private sector 
banks form syndicates to fund loans, as needed, for this new company.63
Sanwa’s business relationships were strongest with light industry and commercial enter-
prises that served the consumer economy around its base in Osaka. While the momentum of 
sectoral growth had been shifting toward heavy industry and away from light industry since 
the Manchurian Incident, the trend became much more pronounced under the economic 
controls introduced after July 1937. Sanwa was handicapped, its historians think, by having 
all its Head Office functions in Osaka, rather than in Tokyo where it could more easily have 
cultivated relations with important central authorities. Even so, Sanwa’s business expanded 
because the rising prices after 1937 contributed to higher revenues in some segments of the 
civilian economy, and some Osaka-area light manufacturing industries benefited from grow-
ing sales in the territories where the Japanese army gained dominance.64 
Sanwa’s forerunner banks had been strong in financing of the Osaka textile industry, 
and Sanwa continued to play an important part in providing funds for this industry. But the 
bank could not escape being influenced by the mood of the times. Adapting to circumstance, 
Sanwa displayed what its historians describe as a “tendency to move aggressively into financ-
ing of war-related industry.” Particularly from around the end of 1940, Sanwa adopted a 
positive posture in soliciting new business with companies in war-related manufacturing, and 
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with the Osaka Army Ordnance Manufacturing Facility and other military-related offices and 
operations in and around Osaka. After the Ministry of Finance eased restrictions on branch-
ing, Sanwa moved into a number of new locations in the Tokyo, Osaka, Kyoto, and Fukuoka 
areas.65 In June 1941, Sanwa joined Sumitomo, Yasuda, Dai-Ichi, Mitsubishi, Mitsui, and 
Dai-Hyaku banks in forming a lenders’ council, and two months later, Sanwa became a 
member of the new Crisis Cooperative Finance Organization.66 “Sanwa Bank provided loans 
to enterprises that had been singled out for favored treatment by the government, and ag-
gressively participated in the syndicated investing and lending, and gradually we shifted to 
a posture of receptiveness to the demands of wartime.”67 Not only Sanwa, but the other big 
banks also were acting opportunistically, as competitive businesses generally do.
Sumitomo’s historians highlight the impact of the Sino-Japanese War by examining 
credits to Sumitomo group companies and credits shared with other banks. Before 1937, 
they note, loans to affiliated companies comprised a relatively small portion of assets. As of 
31 December 1936, the bank had ¥8.5 million in credit outstanding to various Sumitomo 
companies, or just 1.4% of all loans. That changed quickly after Lugou Bridge. By the end of 
1937, the figures were ¥35.3 million and 4.8%, and thereafter the levels continued to climb 
rapidly.
SUMITOMO BANK LOANS TO AFFILIATED COMPANIES, 1938–1943 (millions of yen)
As of
31 December Loans
Pct Change from
Year Earlier
Percent of 
Total Loans
1938 63.6 --- 7.1
1939 108.9 71.1 9.0
1940 202.6 86.1 12.6
1941 290.4 43.3 15.2
1942 352.1 21.2 16.4
1943 507.5 44.1 17.0
Source: Excerpted from data in table, Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, p. 362.
Several Sumitomo companies were critical suppliers to the military. The bank’s house histori-
ans note that, but do not elaborate. Readers are left to their own devices if they want to know 
what these firms produced, and in what quantities. 
By late 1940, one-tenth of Sumitomo’s loans were participations in syndicated financ-
ings (kyōdō yūshi 共同融資). Most of these syndications were arranged by the Industrial 
Bank of Japan. Tight government controls grew still more intrusive in October 1940 with 
implementation of the Decree on Funds Management for Banks and Others. Having less 
scope for independent credit decision making, by year-end, Sumitomo had departed from 
two traditional commercial banking practices: it was making more funds available to indus-
trial borrowers than to commercial borrowers, and more than 10% of its loans were for pur-
poses of funding fixed investment in plant and equipment.68 The bank’s historians stress that 
senior managers insisted on prudent lending standards even while assenting to the political 
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objectives of the state. They quote Managing Director (later President) Okahashi Rin’s 岡橋
林 remarks at the 1940 managers meeting: “Of course we give priority to the common good 
[kōeki 公益] and we adapt to state policy [kokusaku 国策]. But we cannot neglect the ele-
ments of safe banking [ginkō no shigoto no ue de wa anzen no yōso 銀行の仕事の上では安
全の要素]. It is being said that it does not matter if a bank loan becomes overdue, and that 
it is acceptable to make loans in areas where there are many risks, so long as there is compen-
sation from the government. However, I think that even if the government offers compensa-
tion, one cannot take this position. Banks have a need to make loans that can be used [and 
then repaid] at a time certain.”69 A more critical reading of the record might emphasize the 
acquiescence, and interpret the comment about lending standards as a mere face-saving ges-
ture. The problem for historians is how to judge a statement that captures the ambivalence of 
practical financiers of 1940, expressing acceptance of the system as it was, on the one hand, 
and reservations about the safety and soundness of that system, on the other.
After the outbreak of conflict in China, the Yasuda General Managers Meeting of April 
1938 deliberated on what measures the bank should take. They decided, “With respect to 
putting government policies into concrete practice, we can do no more than to make the best 
of (zensho suru hoka nai 善処するほかない) whatever particular circumstances we find 
ourselves in, in keeping with the development of events. In the end what is most important 
is to keep increasing loans as we increase deposits, and as a result of this, to increase profits.”70 
Not attributed to any single person, or even to the general managers as a body, this statement 
might be characterized as fatalistic or amoral. Then again it might be called realistic. It cer-
tainly shows an unresisting and pragmatic attitude, and a willingness to accept the situation 
as it was and play the hand that had been dealt. 
Banks’ powers of discretion in making lending decisions were limited as the govern-
ment’s financial controls strengthened. Yasuda’s overt response was positive. In August 1940, 
a Head Office notification to branches and departments stated: “(1) With regard to new 
loan transactions, we will give priority to those that serve the purposes of national policy. . . . 
(2) We will refrain from providing funds for speculation and from making new loans that 
have nonessential purposes. (3) As for existing loans, we will increase our scrutiny, and we 
will make the utmost effort to reduce or obtain full repayment of those that have purposes 
with which we are not satisfied.”71 The effect of this seems to have been that Yasuda reduced 
its lending to commercial businesses with which it traditionally had dealt, and focused more 
on enterprises connected with the war effort. The bank’s historians are too discreet to identify 
particular borrowers in this instance. They do, however, give the example of the textile indus-
try, in which the bank made credit available to twenty-four of the twenty-seven companies 
that had been set up as organs of central control, and with twenty-five of the twenty-eight 
controlled regional distribution companies.72 
Investments in securities 
The government greatly increased its spending after the outbreak of war in China. 
Within months, government payments to manufacturers circulated through the economy 
and eased the tightness that had obtained in the financial sector. In the short term, corpora-
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tions that had borrowed from banks were able to pay down their loans, and the banks’ restric-
tive policies regarding the extension of new credit resulted in a decline in loans. Customers 
were able to make deposits, but instead of using those deposits as the basis for new loans, 
bank asset allocation managers were putting the money to work by investing in securities, 
especially the new issues of government bonds.
In the four-and-a-half years from 30 June 1937 to 31 December 1941, Mitsubishi Bank 
added ¥324 million in securities to its portfolio, an increase of over 80 percent. Typically, 
Mitsubishi’s historians disclose more specific information about the targets of this investment 
than their counterparts at the other big banks. Close to nine-tenths of the increase was gov-
ernment bonds, which made up 69 percent of the portfolio at the end of 1941, but corporate 
bond holdings also increased by 11 percent to ¥149 million. Of course most of the funds put 
into government bonds supported the war in China. The composition of the bond portfolio 
suggests that much of the bank’s corporate investment, also, backed continental expansion 
or war-materiel production during these years: issuer names included the Industrial Bank of 
Japan (the primary supplier of funds to companies engaged in war production), North China 
Development Company, Central China Development Company, Nenryō Kōgyō Gaisha, and 
other companies that manufactured products used by the military.73 
Fuji Bank historians quote, without attribution and without comment, a statement 
made at the General Managers Meeting of November 1941: “With the international situation 
becoming urgent, it is certain that we will see a growth by leaps and bounds of military 
expenditures, and that the amount of public debt issuance will increase more and more. 
Mission number one for us is to raise a large amount of funds so that we will be able to 
acquire [literally, digest] public bonds. Next, mission number two is to raise the large amount 
of funds needed to maintain and expand productive capacity in order to assure the supply of 
military stores of all kinds.”74 
The Industrial Bank of Japan was ordered to provide financing to strategic industrial 
companies in April 1939,75 and the state undertook to cover any losses that the bank might 
suffer. In August 1941, the government implemented the “munitions bills underwriting 
system” (gunju tegata hikiuke seido 軍需手形引受制度), whereby the Bank of Japan would 
rediscount at any time the munitions bills that private sector banks had acquired from the 
underwriter, the Industrial Bank of Japan.76 The authors of the Fuji Bank history do not 
comment on whether their bank ever had to rediscount munititions bills; indeed they do not 
specifically say that the bank purchased munitions bills from IBJ, but it is likely that it did.
The Pacific War
It may astonish readers that most of the Big Six histories do not refer by name to Pearl 
Harbor, Midway, Guadalcanal, Okinawa, or any other of the hugely consequential military 
encounters of the Pacific War. Almost surely this reflects accurately the focus of the bankers 
on banking business, even during the war years. This is not to say that there is no awareness 
of the war in the banks’ accounts. The war determines almost everything. But it is seen almost 
exclusively in economic perspective. In combination with the policies of governments that 
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were beyond the capacity of the banks to influence, the war was a cause of shortages, hard-
ship, and sacrifice of all kinds. The writers of Mitsui’s eighty- and hundred-year histories, for 
example, are not disposed to criticize the overall aims of the war, or the conduct of business 
by their corporate predecessors under conditions of wartime. Essentially theirs is an ambiva-
lent position. On the one hand, they can observe with regret that economic freedoms were 
usurped, many lives lost, and much property destroyed; war meant waste and destruction. 
On the other, they can report without irony or bitterness on the kind of thinking that led 
their forebears to support a long and terrible war.
In a matter-of-fact tone, and without meting out praise or blame, Sanwa’s writers offer 
what can be taken as a representative interpretation of the development of the control system 
for financial institutions during the Pacific War years. The process was “the establishment of 
a self-regulating financial control structure centered on the Bank of Japan.” The general con-
ception was that financial institutions would control themselves in conformity to state policy. 
In practice this meant that banks, securities firms, insurance companies, savings societies, 
and other financial organizations were deprived of their autonomy. “Essentially it was close 
to financing upon command.”77 It goes without saying (and the Sanwa historians did not say 
it) that all who continued to follow the banking profession cooperated.
SourceS of fundS 
With the widening of the war to the Pacific and Southeast Asia, the government’s need 
for funds became more severe. It decided to mobilize even the small savings of ordinary 
people. New regulations for savings accounts encouraged small deposits (chochiku 貯蓄), 
offering compound interest under certain rules, increasing the number of choices for savers, 
and, from 1943, allowing ordinary banks to compete for savings by offering accounts similar 
to those hitherto restricted to savings banks and credit unions. In 1944, newly designed ac-
counts called National Debt Deposits were offered, permitting neighborhood associations or 
workplaces to gather people’s savings and specify that the funds be invested in government 
bonds; banks took these deposit funds, and allowed withdrawals only for purposes of govern-
ment bond purchases. Funds raised through these small savings vehicles purchased a sizable 
number of bonds.78
Teikoku Bank added risk assets faster than it took in deposits, toward the end of the 
war. By the end of September 1943, the total of loans and securities in the bank’s portfolio 
(mostly government bonds) was greater than total deposits. Earlier, Mitsui and Dai-Ichi had 
always had more deposits than loans and securities. The bank had to fund the difference by 
borrowing. This was typical of the biggest banks.
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DEPOSITS, LOANS, AND SECURITIES HELD BY TEIKOKU BANK, 1943–1945  
        (millions of yen)
Deposits Loans Securities Borrow ed
( A ) ( B ) ( C ) A - B - C funds
September 30, 1943 5,877         4,003         2,194         (320)          455            
September 30, 1944 7,779         6,057         2,695         (973)          1,130         
September 30, 1945 13,319       14,332       3,374         (4,387)       5,431         
CAGR 50.5% 89.2% 24.0% 270.3% 245.5%  
Source: Data are from Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 429. Compound annual growth rates have been added. 
Cf. the table showing Deposits, Loans, and Securities Held by All Ordinary Banks, 1943–1945, 
Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 354. 
Yasuda’s deposit-amassing effort got a new goal in 1942, when its business department 
newsletter projected five more years of growth at the rate—28.6% per annum—of the previ-
ous three years. With deposits standing at ¥2.88 billion at the end of 1941, the bank would 
top the 10 billion level by the end of 1946. “A ‘¥10 billion 5–year plan’ is not necessarily a 
dream,” the writers asserted.79 In fact “10 billion in savings” (hyakuoku chochiku 百億貯蓄) 
was already a marketing slogan, and the Fuji Bank history carries a picture of the Kanazawa 
Branch, taken in 1939, showing banners with two patriotic slogans, “Ichioku isshin, hyakuoku 
chochiku” 一億一心百億貯蓄 and “Kōgun banzai” 皇軍万歳. (The caption simply says 
“Kanazawa Branch hung with a banner of the 10 billion in savings movement.” Fuji histori-
ans fail to remark on the pairing of the bank’s advertising campaign slogan with the ultrana-
tionalist propaganda catch phrase of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, ichioku isshin, 
“one hundred million people with one mind.”)80 In May 1943 President Mori urged general 
managers to take the attitude expressed by the slogans “The Bank that is Friendliest to the 
People” and “The Bank that is Easiest to Do Business With.” The number of deposit accounts 
rose from 610,000 at the end of 1941 to 1,830,000 as of 30 September 1944. Some amalga-
mations of smaller banks into Yasuda occurred in 1943 and 1944, and with the government 
pouring a huge amount of funds into the economy to support the war effort, deposits did 
reach ¥10 billion by 30 June 1945.81 
uSeS of fundS 
Loans 
The escalation of the war is reflected in movements in Mitsui Bank loan assets. A 
breakdown of the loan portfolio by industry as of 30 June 1942, shows the continuation of 
the trend away from electric utilities and railway lending and toward war goods supply.
MITSUI BANK LOANS AS OF 30 JUNE 1942 (millions of yen)
Industry Loans Percent of Total
Holding companies 120.8 11.9
Trading companies 128.8 11.8
Machinery and tools 108.2 9.9
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Industry Loans Percent of Total
Wholesale goods 98.7 9.0
Chemicals 88.5 8.1
Textile manufacture 82.1 7.5
Individuals 80.5 7.4
Metal manufacturing 72.3 6.6
Mining 59.8 5.5
Food and processed food 45.2 4.1
Electric and gas utilities 41.7 3.8
Transportation 38.0 3.5
Other 118.1 10.8
T O T A L 1,091.7 100.0
Source: Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 425.
The pace of the big banks’ activity accelerated as the military situation grew more desperate.
BIG FIVE BANK LOANS IN THE FINAL STAGE OF THE WAR (millions of yen)
Teikoku Mitsubishi Yasuda Sumitomo Sanwa Big 5 Total
1943 4,003 2,795 2,673 2,813 2,453 14,737
1945 14,332 9,202 10,997 8,109 6,793 49,433
CAGR 89.2% 81.4% 102.8% 69.8% 66.4% 83.1%
As of 30 September. CAGR = Compound annual growth rate
Source: Data excerpted from table, Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 425.
A small portion of the phenomenal growth of Teikoku loans is explained by the amalga-
mation of Fifteenth Bank in September 1944.82 But vastly the greatest part of the increase was 
attributed by Mitsui historians to the implementation of the Law on War Supply Companies, 
from December 1943. This law made certain companies responsible for production of vital 
materiel, exempting those firms from restrictive controls and guaranteeing profits in exchange 
for the heavy burden of being so designated. At the same time, the government adopted 
the “system of designated financial institutions for providing funds for war supply.” Two 
lists of designated war supply companies were issued. The first had 150 names, the second, 
424. Teikoku Bank was designated as the financial institution in charge of loans to nineteen 
companies in the first group and 92 companies in the second. Acquisition of Fifteenth Bank 
brought responsibility for fifteen more companies, and a later supplemental list of 109 com-
panies included seventeen more for whose borrowing needs Teikoku was put in charge. The 
writers of Mitsui’s history disclose the names of the 173 war supply companies that Teikoku 
had been designated to arrange financing for, by the end of 1944.83 In principle one war sup-
ply company was linked with one bank, as these laws were enforced, but bigger companies 
had more than one bank. It was the needs of the war supply companies under this system that 
drove the tremendous loan expansion of the last couple years of the war. 
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What were known as “matched loans” (miai yūshi 見合融資) to insurance companies 
mounted up to a significant total in this same final period of the war. In Teikoku Bank’s case, 
credits to fourteen firms aggregated to ¥4.1 billion by September 1940. The purpose of these 
was to cover payments of claims for war destruction, especially from air raids. The govern-
ment eventually paid compensation money to the insurer, but during the interval between 
the settlement of the claim and the receipt of reimbursement from the state, insurance com-
panies needed bank loans to fund their operations.84
When the Law on Special Measure for War Supply Finance was implemented, 
Mitsubishi elevated the unit in charge of war supply finance to the level of a division (bu 部). 
Bank historians reproduce the division chief ’s instructions to branches, then they quote the 
reminiscences of a staff member. The former betrays no sign of misgiving about the policy 
of lending to war supply companies, only a concern for executing that policy efficiently. Nor 
does the latter contain anything apologetic—just a prosaic statement about the work and the 
spirit that animated those engaged in it, concluding, “We in the division and the managers 
of certain of our bank’s operating units, as the ones charged with carrying out this war supply 
finance, were treated as public servants. This was probably because the lending we were doing 
touched upon military secrets, if only a little. We felt that we were in the first rank of the line 
of battle on the home front, and our consequent sense of responsibility was made heavier.”85 
The Industrial Bank of Japan was charged with much of the responsibility for financing 
the buildup of production needed in wartime, but it could not carry the burden alone. In 
October 1940, the government extended the order to provide credit accommodations to the 
ordinary banks, as well. In August 1942, the minister of finance demanded that the city banks 
(shichū ginkō 市中銀行) shift from concentrating on commercial finance to concentrating 
on manufacturing finance. He proposed that the city banks act jointly when making invest-
ments or providing loans, and when collecting interest and principal payments. Yasuda Bank 
was one of eleven institutions, led by the Industrial Bank, that thereupon started the Wartime 
Cooperative Finance Association (Jikyoku Kyōdō Yūshi Dan 時局共同融資団).86 Already 
in May that year the National Financial Control Association had been set up. More guidance 
was being provided. Less scope for independence or exercise of discretion was left.
Writing of the lending business of their bank after 8 December 1941, Sanwa historians 
take their usual accounting approach, tracking the movements of four categories of loans at 
intervals. They compare Sanwa’s balance sheet figures for loans on bills (short term, typically 
unsecured), overdraft facilities extended to customers, loans on deeds (long term, sometimes 
collateralized), and bills discounted with the totals for the Big Six banks and all ordinary 
banks. They describe the furtherance of the process of concentration of credit on war-related 
manufacturing industries. They do not disclose a single customer’s name or provide specifics 
of the purpose of any individual loan transaction.87 Still, what they do choose to reveal pro-
vides some insight into the changes wrought by war at their bank and elsewhere.
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INCREASES IN LOANS, BY TYPE, 1941–1945   (millions of yen)
1Compound annual growth rate, 12/31/41 through 3/31/45. 
2Annualized rate of change, 3/3/45 through 9/30/45. NM indicates that the annualized rate of decline 
was greater than 100.0%.
Source: Data are excerpted from Sanwa Ginkō shi, p. 150. “Big Six” figures are for five banks from 
4/1/43, following the Mitsui-Dai-Ichi merger into Teikoku.
Until the last phase of the war, Sumitomo Bank had an aggregate limit on loans to af-
filiated companies. This was not set down in writing, but house historians discern it in the 
pattern of the bank’s credit commitments. They believe there was an agreement between 
the Honsha and the highest officers of the bank, grounded on the conviction of Sumitomo 
Kichizaemon and others that it would have been improper to take deposits from ordinary 
people and put them to uses that were primarily to Sumitomo’s own advantage. Lending 
SUMITOMO BANK LOANS TO AFFILIATED COMPANIES, As of 31 August 1945  
        (millions of yen)
Borrow er Amount Borrow er Amount
Sumitomo Metal Industries 805.6         Sumitomo Kyodo Electric Pow er 6.2             
Sumitomo Honsha 221.7         Sumitomo Land and Engineering 1.6             
Sumitomo Communications Industries 162.9              Subtotal 1,678.8      
Sumitomo Electric Industries 153.2         Sumitomo  Processing  Industries 22.5           
Sumitomo Chemical Co. 148.3         Nippon Plate Glass 9.4             
Sumitomo Mining 121.8              Total Sumitomo-Aff iliated Loans 1,710.8      
Sumitomo Aluminum Refining 33.3                All Domestic Loans 6,891.0      
Sumitomo Machinery 24.2           Sumitomo-Aff il. / All Domestic Loans 24.8%  
Source: Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, p. 365.
heavily to affiliated companies would have given the appearance of using other people’s mon-
ey as, effectively, Sumitomo’s own. In practice, therefore, the bank restricted total loans to 
Sumitomo companies to 10% of total deposits, and within the overall limit, the bank set 
Balance Pct Balance Pct CAGR1 Balance Pct AGR2
Sanw a 1,666     100.0% 5,445     100.0% 44.0% 6,793     100.0% 55.6%
TOTAL Big Six 9,141     100.0% 32,493   100.0% 47.7% 49,458   100.0% 131.7%
All Ordinary Banks 15,143   100.0% 40,004   100.0% 34.8% 60,059   100.0% 125.4%
Sanw a 1,164     69.9% 3,970     72.9% 45.9% 5,884     86.6% 119.7%
Loans on Big Six 7,312     80.0% 24,652   75.9% 45.3% 44,066   89.1% 219.5%
bills All Ordinary Banks 11,157   73.7% 30,605   76.5% 36.4% 53,468   89.0% 205.2%
Sanw a 223        13.4% 620        11.4% 37.0% 592        8.7% -8.8%
Overdraft Big Six 836        9.1% 2,520     7.8% 40.4% 2,273     4.6% -18.6%
facilities All Ordinary Banks 1,742     11.5% 3,007     7.5% 18.3% 2,756     4.6% -16.0%
Sanw a 38          2.3% 747        13.7% 150.0% 257        3.8% NM
Loans on Big Six 106        1.2% 3,868     11.9% 202.5% 2,097     4.2% -70.6%
deeds All Ordinary Banks 641        4.2% 5,467     13.7% 93.4% 3,500     5.8% -59.0%
Sanw a 241        14.5% 108        2.0% -21.9% 60          0.9% -69.1%
Bills Big Six 887        9.7% 1,453     4.5% 16.4% 1,022     2.1% -50.5%
discounted All Ordinary Banks 1,603     10.6% 925        2.3% -15.6% 335        0.6% NM
12/31/41 9/30/453/31/45
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borrowing sublimits for individual companies. Actual loans to affiliates outstanding at year-
end averaged considerably less than 10% until 1942—from 1932 through 1936, 2.0%, from 
1937 through 1941, 6.2%. In 1942 loans to Sumitomo companies reached 10.0% of total 
deposits, and the next year, 11.3%.88 
Fuji historians record that their bank altered its organization and its credit decision 
making to contribute to the war effort. And they do not avoid preserving words of their chief 
executive in May 1943 that justify the change in credit policy and betray no regrets. The 
bank placed a new Loan Section within the Loan Department in August 1942, and charged 
it with promoting financing activity directed at “industries critical to the times” (jikyoku 
sangyō 時局産業). In March the next year, with the military situation turning against Japan, 
the government designated iron and steel, coal, light metals, shipping, and aircraft as the five 
especially important industries, and directed that resources be concentrated on increasing 
their productivity. Three months later the government released a Plan for Full Provisioning 
of Companies Engaged in Strengthening War Potential, providing even stronger state guid-
ance over the employment of financial resources. In July 1943 the Law on Disposition of 
Funding for Full Provisioning of Companies went into effect, instituting tighter controls to 
harness whatever buying power might not already be under state control and to prevent funds 
from being put to use for anything but war production. The government was empowered, 
when it was regarded as necessary, to order the banks to provide matched loans (miai yūshi) 
to certain factories and facilities. “For our bank’s part,” the Fuji historians write, “we worked 
even harder to expand our transactions with the especially important industries.” Speaking in 
May 1943, President Sonobe Sen 園部濳 urged branch general managers to do more, and 
lamented that Yasuda was a laggard in its peer group: “Our bank long has had close relation-
ships with companies in the commercial sector and the light industry sector, and there are 
areas in which we have not been a follower to anyone. In the heavy industry sector that is 
currently being emphasized and expanded rapidly, however, we must frankly acknowledge 
that we are regrettably a little behind the other great banks.”89 
In December 1943, the Law on War Supply Companies was implemented. It desig-
nated manufacturers of ordnance, aircraft, ships, and other important armaments and sup-
plies as War Supply Companies, and imposed a degree of oversight that was tantamount to 
state management. To ensure sufficient financing for the operation of these firms, a System 
of Designated Financial Institutions for War Supply Lending was put in place. Based on the 
pattern of business of the last five years, the government chose certain banks to provide funds 
and services to certain companies. In instances when more funds were required than could 
be supplied by the lead bank (or banks), the system ordered that other banks must join in 
financing groups. Yasuda eventually was assigned to be a lead bank for 105 of the more than 
600 War Supply Companies. By 31 January 1945, Yasuda’s aggregate loans to such com-
panies came to ¥1.5 billion, and the bank had booked an additional ¥500 million in loans 
to War Supply Companies for which it was not the primary bank but merely a member of 
compulsory syndicated financings. The total represented thirty percent of all the bank’s loans 
outstanding at that time. All financial institutions together had ¥19.8 billion in loans to 
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War Supply Companies, about a third of that on the books of The Industrial Bank of Japan. 
Teikoku, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, and Sanwa as a group accounted for ¥8.8 billion.90 In what 
turned out to be the last phase of the war, in 1945, the major banks became the principal 
vehicle for financing companies producing war supplies. At this point, a majority of the funds 
went not into capital spending for expansion, but for working capital. In the period 1 April-
30 September that year, all of Japan’s ordinary banks laid out new loans totaling ¥20 billion, 
more than twice the ¥9.5 billion of the prior semiannual period. About 85 percent of the 
increase in the six months to 30 September was accounted for by the five largest banks.91
Investments in securities 
National bond issuance from 1942 through August 1945 came to ¥79.6 billion. One of 
the central problems of wartime fiscal and financial policy was how to facilitate the absorp-
tion of this debt by the market. The Bank of Japan underwrote 70%, or ¥55.8 billion, of the 
total, in the full expectation that it would be able to sell most of that amount to private sector 
financial institutions. In May 1942, banks lost their discretionary power to decide how much 
to invest in government bonds; the National Financial Control Association demanded that 
banks put the equivalent of 60% of all new deposits into national bonds. As noted above, or-
dinary banks succeeded in drawing sizable new deposits, in some measure because they began 
to offer accounts for small savers. They applied the designated proportion of these funds to 
investments in national bonds.92
With its gigantic deposit base, Yasuda was able to absorb a considerable amount of gov-
ernment bonds. National debt issues in the bank’s portfolio totaled ¥600 million, or 25% of 
deposits, in December 1945; by 30 September 1944, the figures were ¥2.1 billion and 30% 
of deposits. After this things deteriorated for Yasuda and also the other large banks, and they 
had to rely on borrowings from BOJ, rather than new deposits, to fund their financing of 
massive amounts for the war.93
Consolidation in the Banking Industry
Focusing first on small, poorly capitalized banks that had encountered great difficulty 
in the 1920s, the Ministry of Finance had advocated a policy of bank amalgamations as early 
as 1928, when a revised banking law was promulgated. In a Diet session of 1936, Minister of 
Finance Baba Eiichi 馬場鍈一 spoke up for reducing the number of banks to one or two per 
prefecture. The proponents of consolidation believed that the financial needs of the country 
would be best served by a system with fewer, stronger banks. By 1942, this thinking had been 
applied even to the biggest banks. Many agreed that mergers among the large city banks were 
necessary in order to fund the war production effort. The Dai-Ichi history observes that this 
reveals the spirit of sacrifice that prevailed at the time—anything for the sake of pursuing the 
war—and the power of the state.94 The diminishing number of private sector banks reflects 
both official encouragement and the purely economic exigencies of wartime: in 1937, there 
were 377 ordinary banks; in 1940, 286; in 1943, 101; and in 1945, only 61.95 
In May 1942, the Financial Industry Adjustment Law gave the government the power 
to order banks to merge. With the prospect of being forced into a combination not of their 
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own choosing, senior managers of top banks began thinking seriously about which institu-
tions might be compatible. They knew that if they did not act, they might be acted upon by 
the authorities. Contextualizing more than the house historians, Asakura makes clear that 
although the state may not have directed the details of the mergers of Mitsui and Dai-Ichi, 
Mitsubishi and Dai-Hyaku, or Yasuda and Chūya, there was pressure from above to con-
solidate. Yūki Toyotarō, governor of the Bank of Japan and by virtue of that office head of 
the National Financial Control Association (Zenkoku Kin’yū Tōsei Kai 全国金融統制会), 
was a pivotal figure. When at a late November meeting of the ordinary banks a merger of 
Fifteenth Bank and Dai-Hyaku 第百 Bank was put on the table for consideration, he quickly 
initiated informal discussions between Mitsui and Dai-Ichi, and between Mitsubishi and 
Dai-Hyaku. Things moved swiftly, and within a week the two deals were done.
The notion of a union had occurred to Mitsui management before 1942. Mandai 
Junshirō 万代順四郎, who had been promoted from managing director to chairman of 
Mitsui Bank on 10 February 1937, approached Dai-Ichi Bank president Akashi Teruo and 
proposed a merger. Mandai went through the powerful Yūki, but after a couple of weeks 
of deliberation, Dai-Ichi management rejected the proposal. Privately Akashi confided to 
Mandai that he himself favored combining the two banks, and that he wanted to keep the 
idea in mind. The topic, however, remained off the table for nearly six years. Merger discus-
sions revived when the Mitsui chairman called at the Bank of Japan on 17 December 1942, 
to convey his opinion of the suggested merger of the Dai-Hyaku and Shōwa banks.96 Mandai 
suggested to Yūki that what was really needed was a merger of big banks, and he named 
Mitsui and Dai-Ichi as candidates. For Mitsui, a major attraction was that Dai-Ichi Bank 
was, as Mitsui historians describe it, “an excellent bank that was not [part of ] a so-called 
zaibatsu.”97 Meetings with Dai-Ichi executives were quickly arranged, and by 25 December, 
the two sides agreed on a merger of equals, with a new name and with capital of ¥200 mil-
lion, effective 31 March 1943. Mandai and Akashi were charged with working out, in Yūki’s 
presence, details of Mitsui family share ownership and matters related to financing of Mitsui-
related companies. Later it was determined that Dai-Ichi’s Head Office would become the 
headquarters of the new institution, and that Akashi would serve as chairman and Mandai 
as president. 
The agreement was announced on 28 December. The document released to the public is 
a prime example of the patriotic orthodoxy that prevailed in Japan at the time, justifying the 
pooling of the two big banks’ resources in the context of the need to contribute to “certain 
victory in the Greater East Asia War and the achievement of the great work of making Asia 
prosperous . . . at a time when the nation faces an unprecedented emergency and we must 
work together with all our strength, one hundred million people of one mind.” Dissolving 
themselves as separate entities, Dai-Ichi and Mitsui would strive to “serve the nation in fi-
nance” (kin’yū hōkoku 金融報国) as a new bank in which they joined on equal terms. Mitsui 
historians quote the full text; they offer no exegetical comments. When Akashi and Mandai 
sealed the deal formally by signing a contract on 11 January 1943, article 2 specified the name 
of the new bank. It would be the Teikoku (Imperial) Bank 帝国銀行.98 
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At the ceremony in late March that inaugurated the new corporation’s operation, 
Chairman Akashi delivered a speech in which he pronounced the three fundamental prin-
ciples of the Teikoku Bank.99 These are included, verbatim, in the Mitsui Bank’s eighty-year 
history. Again the compilers refrain from comment, instead letting the record speak for itself. 
“(1) Banks are the nucleus of the system of credit, and in view of the fact that our institu-
tion exists for the national common well-being, we seek to contribute to the properly sound 
growth of the financial industry segment of the economy by fair and honest management 
of our business. (2) Holding as our ideal the elevation and strengthening of morality in the 
world of economic affairs, we seek to realize fully the spirit of harmony and cooperation. 
(3) Conforming to the goals of the state, in the present crisis, we will devote all our efforts to 
increasing the savings of all levels of the Japanese people, to absorbing the national debt, and 
to supplying funds for the expansion of production. We seek to carry on our business with 
enthusiasm that conveys our passion for the brave fighting and certain victory in the World 
War.”100 
In the event, Mitsui historians observe, it was difficult to unify two companies with 
different traditions, structures, personnel systems, and sets of internal rules. The problems 
of integrating staffs were the most demanding. The process did not go forward as quickly as 
the top managers had hoped.101 Tashiro reveals—as Mitsui historians do not, in their account 
of the merger—a distinct lack of enthusiasm on the part of two former Dai-Ichi presidents. 
Both agreed to the proposal to join their bank with Mitsui, but they expressed their acquies-
cence in tepid terms. Sasaki Yūnosuke 佐々木勇之助, Shibusawa Eiichi’s 澁澤榮一 right-
hand man and successor as president, declared, “It’s unavoidable.” Ishii Kengo 石井健吾 
stated simply, “It’s the times.”102 The misgivings of the Dai-Ichi elders may have been widely 
shared throughout the new Teikoku Bank, for this corporate marriage did not long survive 
the war. In 1948, the partners demerged. 
Dai-Ichi historian Tashiro articulates that bank’s understanding of the meaning of the 
short-lived merger: “The significance of the establishment of Teikoku Bank was in our co-
operation, as a big bank, with the achievement of the objectives of the war.”103 Mitsui had a 
different view. In his 1976 authorized hundred-year history of Mitsui Bank, Asakura Kōkichi 
朝倉孝吉 characterized the merger that created Teikoku Bank as “the biggest event in the 
hundred-year history of this bank.”104 He quotes the Ministry of Finance banking bureau 
chief of the time (later governor of the Bank of Japan), Yamagiwa Masamichi 山際正道, on 
the meaning of the amalgamation: “It is a great transformation to take a bank that a so-called 
zaibatsu has operated as one wing of its operating companies and turn it into an institution 
purely in public service to the nation, with no corporate relationship to the so-called zaibatsu. 
Further, this epoch-making change was not done at the direct urging or order of the govern-
ment or other authorities. The bank managers themselves recognized the needs of the nation, 
and they took a long view of the path that financial institutions will have to progress along 
in the future. The major significance is in the fact that they resolutely carried out this great 
action of their own volition.”105
Mitsubishi’s account of its merger with Dai-Hyaku suggests that the banks were ex-
tremely capable when it came to rationalizing the amalgamation, but they acted so hastily 
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as to make it doubtful that they were really acting of their own volition. After explaining in 
general terms why mergers of big banks had come to seem desirable, the historians say, “In 
the circumstances we have just outlined, and given that there were also the intentions of the 
authorities regarding bank mergers to consider, in December 1942, our bank, through the 
good offices of National Financial Control Association Chairman Yūki, decided on a merger 
with Dai-Hyaku Bank.” This makes it sound as if there were no extensive preparatory discus-
sions between the two principal parties involved—at least it appears that very little time was 
given to due diligence examination of each other’s condition. Once the consolidation had 
been agreed upon, however, Mitsubishi and Dai-Hyaku published a joint announcement 
that made clear that the needs of the state in wartime were driving this deal. The Mitsubishi 
history quotes full texts of this and a Statement of Reasons. Both explained that the objective 
was to facilitate the funding of the state in its moment of emergency. The Statement spoke of 
attaining state objectives; the announcement spoke of achieving the mission of the state. Both 
said that the product of their combination would be “a pure national communal institution” 
(junzen taru kokka kōkyō no kikan 純然タル国家公共ノ機関).106 
The Teikoku deal had been a union of equals, with both parties agreeing to dissolve and 
form a new entity. The Mitsubishi-Dai-Hyaku merger was structured as the absorption of one 
bank by another, following an exchange of nine Mitsubishi shares for every ten Dai-Hyaku 
shares. Mitsubishi Chairman Katō told employees that the two partners in the deal were actu-
ally on the same footing, and that it had been decided to have Mitsubishi absorb Dai-Hyaku 
only because that simplified the procedure. But the Mitsubishi name was the one that sur-
vived, and it was Katō who became president, when the post-merger institution opened for 
business on 1 April 1943.107 Dai-Hyaku, the seventh-largest of the ordinary banks, brought a 
larger branch network and more employees than Mitsubishi to the new bank.
Three days after the Mitsui-Dai-Ichi and Mitsubishi-Dai-Hyaku mergers were agreed 
upon, Yasuda announced it would take over Nippon Chūya Bank 日本昼夜銀行. Likely 
Yasuda knew the smaller bank very well, and had less reason to do a lot of study of its condi-
tion and performance; Nippon Chūya had been part of the Yasuda affiliate network for over 
a decade, and a Yasuda family member was its president. This deal also was heralded in highly 
patriotic terms, and a bank spokesman chose the same phrase as Mitsubishi executives, “a 
pure national communal institution,” to refer to the post-merger entity.108 Banking industry 
consolidation continued in 1944. On 1 August, Yasuda combined with Shōwa Bank and 
the Fifteenth Bank (the “Peers” bank) merged into Teikoku Bank. Later that year, Yasuda 
absorbed the (new) Third Bank. Fuji historians point out that the fortunes of the Shōwa 
Bank, which had been created to take over certain assets and liabilities of Ōmi Bank and other 
institutions that had gone under in the financial panic of 1927, followed the course of the 
small commercial and manufacturing businesses that made up its customer base. At the end 
of 1942, Shōwa Bank finally managed to settle its “special” borrowings (tokuyū 特融) from 
the Bank of Japan, which at their maximum had reached ¥100 million. Early the next year, 
Yasuda Hajime’s 安田一 father-in-law, who was president of the Yokohama Specie Bank, 
suggested to him that Shōwa should be taken under Yasuda Bank’s wing. Not surprisingly, 
this led to merger the following year.109
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Profitability
Soundness, service, and market share are all examined repeatedly and at length in the 
big Japanese banks’ company histories. There is strikingly little discussion of profitability. 
American banks may not publish corporate histories, but they do release quarterly and annual 
reports, and in those, profits are the most important topic.110 This is because shareholders 
and investors are the primary audience, and the banks want to convince this audience that 
the banks’ profitability is benefiting, or could benefit, the readers. A different sensibility is 
at work in the Japanese bank histories. These institutions are not hesitant about trumpeting 
their successes in satisfying customers and serving social needs. In their own annual reports 
in recent years, the same banks and their successors emphasize profits and losses. Treating 
the prewar years when share ownership was not widespread and resentment of the zaibatsu 
was common, however, the big Japanese banks tend to downplay their accomplishments in 
producing wealth for their shareholders. In the few passages of the bank histories in which the 
writers do talk about profits, the explanations are macroeconomic. The skills and strategies of 
the senior managers are not analyzed in the context of gains and losses, nor is any individual 
executive quoted on the desirability of making money or on top management’s satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction with profitability.
Here is a quick survey of what the corporate historians tell us, supplemented by some 
observations made on the basis of data that they present in tables in appendices but do not 
remark on in their texts.
Tashiro touches very briefly on profits in the body of the narrative along with de-
posits, loans, and investments in securities, in the Dai-Ichi Bank history.111 Following the 
Manchurian Incident, initially, profitability improved. Annual return on assets ratcheted up 
steadily for about three years, from 0.71% in 1931 to 0.97% in 1934.112 In 1935, earnings 
declined by more than 8% from 1934, and return on average assets fell to 0.82%; then profits 
and return on assets moved up again, reaching 0.88% for the full year 1937, half of which 
was after fighting began at Marco Polo Bridge. From the outbreak of the China war, Dai-Ichi 
continued to make profits, but at a lower and steadily deteriorating level. In the second half of 
1937, net income of ¥5.4 million represented a return on assets of 0.43%, which happened to 
equal the average semiannual level of the period from July 1931 through June 1937. In every 
subsequent semiannual reporting period through the end of 1941, return on assets declined. 
From the second half of 1937 through the first half of 1941, average return on assets fell to 
0.33%. Between Pearl Harbor and the consummation of the merger into Teikoku Bank at 
the end of March 1943, profitability slipped further, to 0.20% per semiannual period, on 
average, though there was fluctuation. Teikoku Bank produced an average return on assets of 
0.18% per half in the last two years of the war (actually, the two years to 30 September 1945), 
a period during which total assets were growing at a 71.4% compound annual rate.
Mitsubishi Bank’s historians belong to the camp that omits talk about earnings from 
the body of their text. They do include tables of profits and losses in an appendix. Their bank 
sustained a loss in the second half and full year of 1931, then enjoyed several highly rewarding 
periods through the time war broke out in China. Annual average return on total assets ex-
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ceeded 1.00% for six consecutive years through 1937, in fact, and though returns were gradu-
ally eroding in the last three of those years, they averaged 1.22% over this period. Mitsubishi’s 
net income was remarkably stable in the years from 1937 through 1942, in nominal terms, 
fluctuating between ¥5.2 million and ¥6.0 million in each of the twelve semiannual periods. 
In 1943 and 1944, net earnings of ¥10.0 million to ¥11.8 million per period, unadjusted for 
inflation, were nearly double what had been normal in the six previous years. The year of sur-
render was a disaster in financial terms as in virtually every other way. A profit of ¥3.0 million 
was posted for the first six months, down 73.5% from the same half of 1944, and a net loss 
of ¥4.5 million was recorded for the second half of 1945.113 The trend in Mitsubishi’s per-
formance can be grasped by looking at average return on total assets in the phases of the war 
years: it was 0.49% per half-year from July 1931 through June 1937; it declined to 0.39% 
from July 1937 through June 1941; it fell further to 0.25% from July 1941 through March 
1943; and it plunged to 0.12% from April 1943 through September 1945.
Mitsui’s scribes, in the eighty-eight pages of the bank’s eighty-year history devoted to 
business results, focus exclusively on balance sheet issues. Nor does Asakura mention profits 
and losses in his short hundred-year history.114 They explain the dynamics of deposit gen-
eration, loan business, securities portfolio management, and foreign exchange business, but 
information on revenue and earnings is relegated to the appendices without comment. The 
data reveal that Mitsui Bank, also, made money for its shareholders. In every half from 1932 
through 1942, the bank had a net profit. In the six years ended 30 June 1937, average semi-
annual net profit of 3.5 million represented an annualized average return on total assets of 
0.72%. Assets grew at a compound annual rate of 15.7% during the Sino-Japanese War 
(actually, from 30 June 1937 to 30 June 1941), but profits did not keep pace, averaging an 
annualized 0.70% return on average total assets. The Pacific War years brought wild gyra-
tions in semiannual performance. These had little to do with the merger that formed Teikoku 
Bank. Mitsui’s average return on assets fell to 0.32%, annualized, between 30 June 1941, 
and the last reporting date before the amalgamation with Dai-Ichi; assets grew meanwhile at 
an annual rate of 14.9%. The impact of war on profitability can be seen most clearly in the 
figures for annual return on average assets of Mitsui Bank and Teikoku Bank: following a loss 
in 1931, the bank earned 1.37% in 1932, then saw that figure decline steadily to 0.46% in 
1943 before ticking back up to 0.48% in 1944.115 
Sanwa’s historians provide more information about profits in the body of their work 
than any other bank’s writers, but characteristically they content themselves with explana-
tions of the shifting mix of business.116 There are no identifications of customer relationships, 
and no references to individual managers. Sanwa’s historians note with pride that in the early 
days after Kōnoike, Yamaguchi, and 34th joined into one, the bank’s asset allocation strategy 
had emphasized securities investment, and consequently “we were able to achieve results that 
generally were quite consistent from period to period.” They also refer approvingly, but un-
fortunately not specifically, to “rationalization of management” practices followed in the early 
years after the merger. Sanwa was big, and it did report net profits in every semiannual period 
from its foundation through the end of the war. But in actuality its returns on assets were the 
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least impressive of the big Japanese banks, and its best period was its second of operation, the 
first half of 1934, when it earned 0.36% on average total assets. From that point, earnings as a 
percent of total assets went steadily downhill through the end of the Pacific War. For purposes 
of comparison, here are average returns for Sanwa in the phases of Japan’s long wartime: from 
July 1933 through June 1937, 0.34%; from July 1937 through June 1941, 0.24%; from July 
1941 through March 1943, 0.17%; and from April 1943 through September 1945, 0.10%.
Sumitomo Bank historians give more attention to market share, and to how balance 
sheet changes reflect movements in the economy and government fiscal policy, than to earn-
ings, but they do discuss profits in the body of their narrative.117 After posting a net loss in 
the last half of 1931, the bank managed to report profits in every semiannual period through 
the end of the Pacific War. Performance improved dramatically in 1932 over 1931, and it 
continued to get better each year through 1934: return on average total assets reached 1.35% 
in the latter year, having been just 0.16% in 1931. Rising profits are attributed by bank his-
torians primarily to sharply higher fee income from securities-related business. The recover-
ing economy stimulated a boom in the bond market in these years. From 1935, Sumitomo’s 
profitability began to decline. Net income ranged between ¥4.9 million and ¥6.4 million per 
half from 1937 through 1941, despite the fact that Sumitomo was writing off certain assets 
and adding to internal reserves in every period. “Earnings followed a stable trend . . . because 
they were supported by a considerable increase in both deposits and loans, despite the low 
interest rates and a rise in expenditures.” As a percent of average total assets, however, earnings 
were shrinking. Nominal profits continued to be fairly stable for over a year after the nation 
launched the Pacific War, but they became volatile after 31 March 1943, fluctuating between 
¥9.0 million and ¥1.1 million. The trend can be seen in a few averages: Sumitomo’s average 
return on total assets was 0.47% per semiannual period from July 1931 through June 1937; it 
was 0.35% from July 1937 through June 1941; 0.21% from July 1941 through March 1943; 
and 0.10% from April 1943 through September 1945. 
Yasuda Bank profits are not discussed in Fuji Ginkō no 100–nen 富士銀行の百年, and 
there are no tables of historical balance sheets and income statements in the appendix. For 
numbers that similar to those in the other banks’ histories, one has to go to the anniversary 
volume the bank put out in 1940, Yasuda Ginkō 60–nen shi 安田銀行六十年史. House 
historians abstain from comment about earnings in the narrative part of this book, but in 
the appendix they provide some information on profits that enables us to see trends, though 
it cannot be compared exactly to the net profit data for each period disclosed by the other 
banks.118 We see that Yasuda’s profit, which had exceeded ¥10 million in all but one of the 
semiannual reporting periods between the great merger of 1923 and the end of 1929, aver-
aged ¥9.2 million per half between 1930 and 1939. The lowest half was the July-December 
1932 period, when earnings were ¥8.3 million, and the highest was the July-December 1939 
period, when net came to ¥11.2 million.
None of the great private sector banks was driven into insolvency by the extreme stress 
of war. They were not, however, in good financial condition on 15 August 1945. Profitability 
had diminished to practically nothing by the time of surrender, though with the single ex-
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ception of Mitsui in the semiannual period just prior to its merger into Teikoku Bank, no 
one actually reported a loss between January 1932 and the second half of fiscal 1945 (which 
began 1 October). With assets ballooning in the Pacific War years, and with no new equity 
issued during those years, shrinking profits meant that capitalization ratios contracted also. 
Borrowing from the Bank of Japan, rather than internally generated profits, had supported 
them and enabled them to stay in business in the final phase of the war.
Evaluating the Explanation “Zensho Suru Hoka Nai”
There are differences among the six big banks in the approach they take to history, 
especially in the degree to which they refer to individual executives and their statements as 
expressions of the corporate will or corporate policy. Sanwa practically leaves individuals out, 
while Mitsui and Yasuda (Fuji) quote extensively and identify bank actions with the execu-
tives who made decisions and explained their reasoning. The other banks fall between these 
extremes. Where there is effective unanimity among the bank historians is in keeping the 
focus on finance and the economy, and taking domestic and international political events as 
conditioning factors for banking business but not as a focus in and of themselves. This is done 
in a consistently commonplace tone. 
The writers (we can think of them as authorized biographers) who recorded these banks’ 
(artificial persons’) stories owned up to collaboration with government policy. Their selection 
of quotations makes it clear that many top executives were highly ambivalent about going 
along, yet the historians did not leave out statements of corporate leaders who were enthusi-
astic patriots, ready to turn their companies into agents of the public wellbeing. As an excul-
patory or anyway mitigating factor in explaining their companies’ abetment of government 
war policies, again and again the bank historians cite the system of economic controls. All 
their accounts show how bank managers’ discretionary power to decide how to employ the re-
sources of their institutions—which were, after all, private sector companies—was gradually 
but steadily undermined. The historians present considerable circumstantial evidence to es-
tablish that deposit generation and asset allocation policies followed, rather than anticipated, 
the progression of the control system.119 Plainly all the bank historians accepted, at least for 
purposes of writing these corporate memoirs, the rationale that their banks had no practical 
alternative to making the best of undesirable situations (zensho suru hoka nai).
In the matter of naming clients’ names and specifying purposes of loan transactions, the 
reticence of most of the Japanese bank historians contrasts with the frank disclosure made by 
the writers of a great recent example of corporate history, The Deutsche Bank, 1870–1995.120 
Harold James, in the chapter covering the period examined in this paper, discusses how 
“Aryanization” came to be implemented in the lending decisions of the largest and most im-
portant German bank, justifying extension of credit to those who bought businesses that Jews 
were forced to sell (pp. 304–306). He tells how Deutsche Bank executives were involved in 
the management of Lufthansa, BMW (Bayerische Motoren Werke), and Daimler-Benz at a 
time when the efforts of those firms were being turned to military buildup (pp. 313–315). He 
names a lot of individuals and firms that eagerly pursued the opportunities, and sometimes 
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shared the goals, of the National Socialist Party. He directly treats the subject of colonization. 
He explicitly discusses moral issues.121
One noted Japanese historian who wrote on the issue of war responsibility, Ienaga 
Saburō 家永三郎, acknowledged that he accepted what he was told about the war with 
China, while it was going on. He had, he said, no sources of information that would have 
enabled him to doubt the version presented to the public. Only later, reading reports about 
the war crimes trials held by the Allies after Japan’s defeat, did he learn about the scheming of 
the Japanese army, and that there had been a massacre in Nanjing. In his ignorance, lucky to 
have been a noncombatant and not a victim of American bombing, he admits to having been 
apolitical during wartime.122 If Ienaga, who was almost certainly as critical of the Japanese 
state and Japanese wartime behavior as anyone, could explain his own posture as the product 
of ignorance, might others be justified in claiming that ignorance is an excuse? Ienaga of 
course could not be charged with killing anyone, or making weapons, or assisting the war 
effort in any meaningful way. But how about other civilians, such as bankers, who went along 
with the system? They too lacked information that might have enabled them to evaluate the 
situation differently. In some of the six big bank histories, the writers make it clear that they 
think their predecessors extended credit in the absence of information about the purpose, 
owing to classification of certain information as military secrets. 
Is one absolved of responsibility if one has been put in a position in which others—or a 
financial control system established by others—make all the critical decisions? This question, 
if one follows it up the chain of decision-making, leads eventually to the flaw in the whole 
system that Maruyama Masao 丸山真男 called “the pluralism and irresponsibility of war-
time power.”123 There is a strain in the accounts published by the six big banks that might be 
understood as a defense against moral criticism: we did as we did because the system would 
not allow us to do otherwise. This, however, is never raised in the context of an explicit review 
of the morality of bank actions during the war. 
The creative process of doing the corporate histories examined in this paper involved 
the usual research, evaluation and selection of evidence, interpretation, and composition, and 
then something else. The extra dimension has to do with the relationship between history 
and corporate identity. When the subject is a going concern—in all these cases, a vigor-
ous (if artificial) person—authorial decisions corporate historians make could have practical 
consequences. Mention of a relationship or transaction in the past, for example, could affect 
a present or future business relationship. Even more importantly, perhaps, what company 
historians set down, by virtue of being written and published, defines bank tradition and 
provides models of acumen and sacrifice of previous generations of leaders and employees. 
What Thomas P. Rohlen observed of a regional bank several years ago is true of the largest 
banks as well, and is articulated from time to time by executives in meetings and company 
publications: “According to the ideology, the present membership is duty bound to repay 
their debt to the past by working to advance the bank for the benefit of future generations. 
Conceptually, the present generation stands in an intermediate position between the past 
and the future bank. This relationship, one that stretches over time and innerlocks different 
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generations, is fundamental to the bank’s sense of history, institutional continuity, and social 
morality.”124 
As Mitsui’s president said when his bank’s eighty-year history was completed, “Our 
intention in publishing a history of the bank is to distribute it to parties with whom we have 
relationships and to communicate the gist of our bank’s story. We would like to make this 
serve as a commemorative message to those whose patronage we have enjoyed for many years. 
We also want to have it read widely by our bank’s employees, and have them reflect deeply 
on the influence of our nation’s fate since our bank was founded, on the support we have had 
from our customers, and on the efforts of previous generations of bank staff members. We 
hope this history will contribute to our devotion to our work in the future.”125 
Fuji Bank historians wrote to their fellow employees, “This book is meant to be a guide 
to our conduct as we go into our second century, and at the same time, we hope that it may 
serve to help those with whom we have relationships, including our shareholders and custom-
ers, to understand the bank better.”126 A former Mitsubishi Bank chairman commented about 
the history his company published in 1954, “For bank employees, this book will be food for 
respectful thought about the zealous efforts of their corporate forebears to preserve the tradi-
tional Mitsubishi spirit and make our company’s business prosper.”127 
Statements such as these remind us that not only do company historians have the usual 
motivations, and the usual limitations, of autobiographers or authorized biographers, but 
also they write with an awareness that the corporate life goes on. They have a corporate pur-
pose for the future as well as a desire to set down the record of the past as they experienced it, 
as seen by their lights. In this context authors of corporate histories are apt to hesitate about 
questioning the wisdom or morality of their predecessors’ strategies and actions. To do so in 
their treatment of the war years might somehow convey a sense of shame or guilt, and that 
would be dysfunctional for the company. Employees almost surely will work harder today 
and tomorrow if they feel pride in their heritage. Clients almost surely will feel better if they 
feel they are dealing with a business with a distinguished background and contented employ-
ees.128 Projecting a positive image is good for the health of the company, and it contributes to 
customer satisfaction. Caveat lector, then.
It is all too easy to condemn Big Six bankers for their compliance with Japanese wartime 
authorities, and to criticize the corporate historians for their acceptance of the explanation 
that the banks could not reasonably have done otherwise than to make the best of an un-
fortunate situation that was beyond their control. Later generations of bankers might have 
been inspired by stories of fierce resistance to the national mobilization policies and to state 
appropriation of practically all financial decision making power. Readers of the bank histories 
might have been stirred to achieve a higher awareness of moral issues, and of moral hazards 
in business situations, if the accounts in those books raised more doubts. But we would be 
ignoring some of the complexity of the human condition if we failed to see a certain dignity 
in the way the wartime bankers faced what they believed to be their social and economic 
duties and in the generally straightforward and unapologetic way the authors tell the banks’ 
stories. 
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The exercise of reviewing Japanese banks’ constructions of their experiences in wartime 
might be modestly useful in helping us to assess the interrelations of political, economic, 
and military institutions in that fateful age. Certainly it should be useful to the writers of the 
next histories of the corporate descendants of the Big Six banks. Future discourses on war-
time actions and their consequences may offer harsher judgments than the accounts we have 
considered here. Then again, they may not. The concerns of future writers are unpredictable. 
Conceivably the next authors of Japanese bank histories will be so taxed by accounting for the 
corporate and industry restructuring of the 1990s and 2000s that they will choose to reduce 
their treatment of the 1930s and 1940s to a few paragraphs.129 They may decide to introduce 
no complications about the morality of collaboration with an authoritarian and expansionist 
state. If, however, historians do reevaluate the big banks in wartime, they should give some 
thought to how confident they are of their own moral ground for judgment. Unquestionably 
there is room for criticism, but only the truly pure can claim authority to condemn out of 
hand what was, in essence, the very ordinariness of the ordinary banks. 
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1 E.g., Lockwood 1954 (1968), Patrick 1967, Johnson 1982.
2 Okazaki and Okuno-Fujiwara 1999, Fletcher 1989, Fletcher 1991 (2001), Matsuura 2002, Metzler 
2002, Metzler 2006.
3 See, e.g., Yamazaki 1991, Imuta 1991, Teranishi 1995, and Teranishi 1999. Notably, although 
Teranishi 1999 cites Mitsui Ginkō 1957 twice and Imuta 1991 cites the history of the Industrial Bank 
of Japan, these recent scholars use Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance statistics and reports exten-
sively but make almost no use of the private sector banks’ corporate histories.
4 Mitani 1980 (1998), Okazaki 1999, Imuta 2002. Imuta focuses on primarily on regional banks, as 
well as on changes in the financial system; see especially his chapter 4, “Ryōtaisen-kan ni okeru kin’yū 
kōzō no saihensei” 両大戦間における金融構造の再編成. 
5 Ogura 1990.
6 The Big Six are here shown in English alphabetical order. The spelling of the name of the first institu-
tion on this list follows the official style, The Dai-Ichi Bank, Limited, with a hyphen and capital “I.” 
See the articles of incorporation of August 1948, Article 1, Daiichi Ginkō­shi 1957, vol. 2, p. 472, and 
photographs of English-language materials used by the bank before the war, e.g., p. 233. Sumitomo 
Ginkō 1998, pp. 85–89, provides a succinct discussion of the adoption of the joint stock corporate 
(kabushiki kaisha 株式会社) form by Mitsui in 1909, Yasuda in 1912, and Sumitomo in 1913. Dai-
Ichi converted to the joint stock form in 1896 (Daiichi Ginkō­shi 1957, vol. 1, p. 588–ff.), Mitsubishi 
converted to the joint stock form in 1919 (Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 145), and Sanwa was 
established as a joint stock company in 1933. Asset values are estimated on the basis of data on the Big 
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Six in Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, pp. 297, 310, 311, and all commercial (ordinary) banks in Goldsmith 
1983, table 5–9, p. 122. 
7 “Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us; artificial are such as are created and devised 
by human laws for the purposes of society and government; which are called corporations or bodies 
politic.” Blackstone, Commentaries, I, i, 123 (1765), quoted in the entry for “corporation,” Oxford 
English Dictionary, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991). 
8 See Asai 1996, pp. 367–382. 
9 In the late 1990s, the issue of corporate sponsorship and impartial scholarship sparked a spirited 
debate in the pages of The Times Literary Supplement. See Pinto-Duschinsky 1998, and the responses 
by historians of Deutsche Bank (Avraham Barkai, Gerald L. Feldman, Lothar Gall, Harold James, and 
Jonathan Steinberg) and Volkswagen (Hans Mommsen) in letters to the editor, TLS, 6 November 
1998.
10 Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 257. Characteristically, the corporate authors put quotation marks around the 
term zaibatsu. Writing for Mitsui twenty years later in Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo 1976, Asakura Kōkichi 
used the term without quotation marks.
11 Sampling the texts of bankers and others who were invited to speak at the Tokyo Ginkō Kurabu, the 
Tokyo Ginkō Shūkaisho, and other bankers’ organizations, one discovers that their discourse was full of 
public spirit and concern for the welfare of both state and society. Texts of speeches were regularly print-
ed in the Ginkō tsūshinroku. Marshall 1967 describes the thinking and rhetoric of business leaders in 
the prewar period, and in his chapter “The Japanese Business Elite and the Defense of Capitalism” (pp. 
95–112) analyzes the response of top businessmen to anti-capitalist attacks. See especially Marshall’s 
passage on the eulogy of Dan Takuma, pp. 102–103. 
12 In the appendices of the works cited in these notes, we see that the capital (shihonkin 資本金) levels 
of the six big banks were as follows (in millions of yen, as of 31 December of all years except 1945, 
which is as of 30 September):
1931 1937 1941 1945
Dai-Ichi 57.5 57.5 57.5 N/A
Mitsui 100.0 100.0 100.0 N/A
Teikoku N/A N/A N/A 220.0
Mitsubishi 100.0 100.0 100.0 135.0
Sanwa N/A 107.2 107.2 146.5
Sumitomo 70.0 70.0 70.0 73.7
Yasuda 150.0 150.0 N/A N/A
13 Daiichi Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, pp. 172–173. Dai-Ichi engaged Tsuchiya Takao, emeritus professor 
of the University of Tokyo, Haiji Shizuo, lecturer of Hirosaki University, and Tashiro Masao, associate 
professor of Hōsei University, to write the history of its first eighty years. Tsuchiya was author of the 
chapters on the prehistory of the bank and operations from its founding as the First National Bank 
(Dai-Ichi Kokuritsu Ginkō) in 1873 through the end of the Meiji period. Haiji wrote about the Taisho 
and early Showa periods, from 1912 through the reimposition of a prohibition on gold exports in 1931. 
Tashiro was responsible for the account of the war years, beginning with the Manchurian Incident, and 
the postwar period to the eightieth anniversary in 1953. The two volumes telling the Dai-Ichi story, 
1,511 pages of text plus nearly 300 pages of appendices, are thus an authorized history by outsiders, 
rather than an “autobiography” by employees. 
14 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 231.
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15 See the table of selected financial statistics of the Big Six banks and all 516 ordinary banks as of 31 
December 1933, Sanwa Ginkō shi 1954, p. 52. Sanwa alone had deposits of over ¥1 billion. Only Sanwa 
and Yasuda had outstanding loans totaling more than ¥500 million, and in this category, also, Sanwa 
was slightly larger. In paid-in capital, Yasuda was ahead, with ¥92.8 million, some 28% more than 
Sanwa’s ¥72.2 million; Mitsubishi was next with ¥69.0 million. Sanwa had almost twice as many offices 
as number two Yasuda and more than three times as many as third-place Sumitomo. Sanwa managers 
knew that they did not need all the three predecessor banks’ locations; within a year they reduced the 
number of offices from 275 to 219. By the end of 1938 the bank operated 198 offices.
16 Sanwa Ginkō shi 1954, p. 66.
17 The Sanwa account seems overly credulous to observers of the corporate reorganizations that have 
followed mergers in the 1980s and 1990s. Restructuring and rationalization—almost invariably ac-
companied by reductions of staff—may proceed according to senior managers’ plans, but whether they 
are achieved smoothly (enkatsu ni tassei sareru 円滑に達成される is the phrase chosen by the Sanwa 
writers) or not is a question on which top management and employees often differ. Sanwa Ginkō shi 
1954, pp. 74–75.
18 Fuji Ginkō 1980, pp. 137–141.
19 Ibid., p. 146. From the death of Yasuda Zenjirō in 1921 to the resignation of Yasuda Hajime in 1940, 
the deputy president was the chief operating officer, or the effective chief executive, at Yasuda Bank, 
while the presidency was held by a member of the Yasuda family. Mitsui Bank and Sumitomo Bank had 
similar organizational structures, though the titles used by their chief operating officers were different.
20 Ibid., p. 148.
21 Ibid., p. 146.
22 Ibid., p. 149.
23 “Wall Street’s Banks Kept to Hierarchy during 1998,” The New York Times, 1 January 1999, p. C1.
24 All the banks’ histories portray Takahashi as a sage minister, brilliant in his policies for restoring 
confidence, bringing Japan out of the recession, and standing up to the military and insisting on fiscal 
responsibility when lesser men would have caved in to their demands for huge increases in military 
spending. Takahashi was of course a martyr, having been assassinated by the young officers in the 26 
February 1936, incident. None of the Big Six writers touches on the flaw in Takahashi’s policy-mak-
ing noted by G. C. Allen (who was on balance an admirer of the old minister): “Takahashi, for all his 
merits, can also be charged with a lack of political realism and foresight. He had cheerfully acquiesced 
for four years in a financial policy which made it possible for the militarists to pursue their ambitions.” 
Allen 1972, p. 137.
25 Daiichi Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, pp. 172–173.
26 Ibid., p. 169.
27 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 232.
28 Ibid., pp. 232–233.
29 Mitsui Ginkō 1957, pp. 422–423.
30 Ibid., pp. 264–265.
31 Fuji Ginkō 1980, p. 142. The new departments were named simply Business I and Business II (dai­
ichi gyōmu ka 第一業務課 and daini gyōmu ka 第二業務課).
32 Ibid., p. 143.
33 Ibid., p. 146.
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36 Daiichi Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, p. 168, and appendix Table 1, selected balance sheet figures, 1927–
1943. The percentages of loans to total assets—not calculated by Tashiro—are as of 31 December 1931 
and 31 December 1935.
37 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), pp. 233–234. The diction in this passage is neutral. “Colonization” 
(takushoku) appears in the name of what was officially styled, in English, the Oriental Development 
Co. (Tōyō Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha 東洋拓殖株式会社). The writers’ phrase for referring gener-
ally to Japan’s economic endeavors in Manchuria is “Manshū keizai no hatten” 満州経済の発展, “the 
economic development of Manchuria.” Not only in the Mitsubishi history, but in the other bank nar-
ratives as well, with respect to Manchuria the words “colony” (shokuminchi 植民地) and “colonial” (or 
“the colonized,” shokumin 植民) are not to be found, nor is a label such as “puppet state” (kairai kokka 
傀儡国家) attached to Manchukuo. The political status of Manchukuo is not discussed; it is implicitly 
accepted that Manchukuo was an independent state. 
38 Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 264.
39 Fuji Ginkō 1980, p. 151.
40 Ibid., p. 157. Nihon Denki Kōgyō merged with Shōwa Hiryō in 1939 to form Shōwa Denkō. Asano 
group companies had been important customers since the early days of the bank, when Yasuda Zenjirō 
had given his support to Asano Sōichirō; Asano Shipbuilding merged with Nippon Kōkan in 1940.
41 Ibid., p. 152–153.
42 For a good summary in English of wartime financial system control laws and regulations, see Teranishi 
1999, pp. 71–74. The original Japanese designations of these regulations for which I give English trans-
lations are as follows: Emergency Funds Adjustment Law (10 September 1937), rinji shikin chōsei hō 
臨時資金調整法; National Mobilization Law (1 April 1938), kokka sōdōin hō 国家総動員法; the 
Decree on Price Controls (18 October 1939), kakaku­tō tōsei rei 価格等統制令; and the Decree on 
Funds Management by Banks and Others (19 October 1940), ginkō­tō shisan un’yō rei 銀行等資産
運用令.
43 Fuji Ginkō 1980, pp. 168–169.
44 Ibid., p. 170.
45 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), pp. 249–250.
46 Ibid., p. 252.
47 Ibid., p. 252.
48 Garon 2000 offers a perceptive analysis of wartime government-promoted savings campaigns, but 
does not consider the actions the banks took to encourage savings. In fact private-sector banks had been 
working hard to raise their levels of deposits at least since the 1920s, and they could take advantage of 
a propensity on the part of customers to save in order to provide for an uncertain future. In the promo-
tion of savings, then, there was continuity with prewar practices that did not depend on government 
initiatives taken after 1937. As we have noted, the big banks became magnets for deposits when many 
small banks encountered difficulties in the 1920s, especially during the financial panic of 1927, as many 
savers switched their accounts to what they thought were safer and sounder institutions.
49 Sanwa Ginkō shi 1954, p. 96. The writers remarked earlier on the government’s measures to mobilize 
the small savings of ordinary citizens. To raise the market’s capacity to absorb government debt, for 
instance, bonds in small denominations were offered to individual savers through post office windows. 
See ibid., pp. 89–94. 
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50 Fuji Ginkō 1980, p. 156.
51 About forty years earlier, Nakamigawa Hikojirō 中上川彦次郎, managing director of Mitsui Bank, 
had been loath even to take deposits, out of concern that in a panic depositors might run on the bank 
and try to withdraw more funds than the bank had in the vault. Going so far as to say, “Deposits are 
borrowings” (yokin wa shakkin da 預金は借金だ), he thought it unwise to put other people’s money at 
risk when they might on short notice, unpredictably, demand the money back. Other views prevailed, 
of course, and Mitsui did take deposits, and used the funds as a resource for building the bank’s asset 
portfolio. Mitsui Ginkō 1957, pp. 139–140.
52 Fuji Ginkō 1980, pp. 156–157.
53 Ibid., pp. 165–166.
54 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), pp. 245–246. The Industrial Bank of Japan was established by its 
own law in 1902; it was not an ordinary bank. It was permitted to raise long-term funds by selling debt 
instruments, and it was charged with making credit available for capital spending (that is, for long-term 
purposes) for manufacturing industries, especially heavy manufacturing. In 1950, it changed its status 
to ordinary bank, and in 1952, it converted into a long-term credit bank.
55 Ibid., pp. 247–248.
56 Ibid., p. 253.
57 Ibid., pp. 279–280.
58 Ibid., pp. 253–256.
59 The discussion of Nanjō and his initiatives comes in a section entitled “Trends of Mitsui-Affiliated 
Companies and the Demand for Funds,” in which the enterprises concerned are identified as keiretsu 
shokigyō 系列諸企業. Mitsui Ginkō 1957, pp. 271–272.
60 Ibid., p. 423.
61 Ibid., pp. 423–424.
62 Ibid., p. 424.
63 Ibid., p. 425.
64 Sanwa Ginkō shi 1954, p. 95. Sanwa eventually remedied the problem of remoteness from Tokyo 
decision makers in the same way as Sumitomo, the other big Osaka bank. In November 1940, Sanwa 
set up a Tokyo Regional Headquarters (Tōkyō Honbu). Ibid., p. 97.
65 Sanwa’s historians place this effort in the context of the deposit raising campaign. Dealing with the 
managers and employees of war-related business organizations, and opening new offices, were good 
ways to obtain deposits needed to fund the bank’s activities in government bond buying and lending. 
Ibid., pp. 97–98.
66 Ibid., p. 98.
67 Ibid., p. 99. Three times in three pages the writers characterize the bank’s attitude in pursuing war-
related business as sekkyokuteki 積極的, aggressive or positive or, in the jargon of American business 
since the 1980s, pro-active. They justify the use of this modifier by describing changing patterns in 
the bank’s business. They might have made the description more vivid and forceful by quoting certain 
executives—historians of some other banks did. In the Sanwa history, there are fewer names of Sanwa 
bankers and fewer names of customers than in the other banks’ books. 
68 Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, pp. 307–308. Hitherto the bank—following the British commercial bank-
ing model rather than the German universal banking model—had generally avoided commitments to 
transactions in which the borrower intended to apply the loan proceeds to long-term purposes.
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which repayment would depend upon exercise of a government guarantee, rather than on the borrower’s 
own capacity to service debt. The word he used for the form of credit support offered by the govern-
ment, by the way, was hoshō 補償 (compensation or indemnity), and not hoshō 保証 (guarantee or 
security).
70 Fuji Ginkō 1980, p. 156.
71 Ibid., pp. 186–187.
72 Ibid., p. 188.
73 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), pp. 280–281. Nenryō Kōgyō was a fuel development and pro-
duction company. Other corporate debt in the bank’s portfolio included Hitachi, Kawasaki Heavy 
Industries, and various Mitsubishi companies.
74 Fuji Ginkō 1980, p. 179. As elsewhere, in speaking of acquiring government bonds, the managers 
used the word that is most literally translated as “digestion” or “absorption,” shōka 消化.
75 In the kaisha rieki haitō oyobi shikin yūzū rei.
76 Fuji Ginkō 1980, p. 170.
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81 Ibid., pp. 184–185.
82 At the time of its takeover by Teikoku, Fifteenth Bank had ¥458 million in loans (Mitsui Ginkō 
1957, p. 426). That was just 4.4% of the total amount of the increase in Teikoku loans during the two-
year period to 30 September 1945.
83 Mitsui Ginkō 1957, pp. 427–428. Some of the firms continued in business as of 1957, when the 
Mitsui history was published. Others had disappeared. The openness of the Mitsui compilers contrasts 
with the reticence of other bank historians, who for the most part are grudging of information about 
specific borrowers’ identities. Cf. the treatment of the Law on War Supply Companies in Fuji Ginkō 
1980, pp. 190–192, and note Yasuda’s loan growth rate in Mitsui Bank’s table of comparative statis-
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84 Ibid., p. 429.
85 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), p. 351–353. The staffer, Hayashida Toshiyoshi 林田敏義, recalls 
that in the last days of the war a soldier was posted in the bank to see that the needed funds were being 
disbursed to the war supply companies. “It was a time when everything was controlled, and in finance, 
as well, we were subject to various extremely strict controls. . . . Often there were meetings between 
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when Tōjō Hideki became prime minister. Ogura was a Sumitomo man, and his career and the treat-
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might have meant to the bank or other Sumitomo firms. Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, p. 358, notes only 
that Ogura left the company to enter the Konoe cabinet. See the entry on Ogura in the Gendai volume 
of Dai jinmei jiten 1953. After the war, according to the same source, he was purged and devoted him-
self to the study of classical Chinese literature.
87 Sanwa Ginkō shi 1954, pp. 149–152.
88 See the table, Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, p. 362. Percentages for 1934 and 1935 are not available, and 
the average for the years between the Manchurian Incident and the Lugou Bridge Incident is based on 
1932, 1933, and 1936. Sumitomo Bank historians avoid linking the word zaibatsu with the Sumitomo 
name exept in their account of postwar Occupation policy. Other Sumitomo-owned or controlled 
firms are identified as “affiliated companies” or “affiliated enterprises,” terms regularly used by prewar 
Sumitomo executives. The main Sumitomo holding company was organized as a limited partnership, 
Sumitomo Gōshi Gaisha, from February 1921 through February 1937, and reorganized as a joint stock 
corporation, Kabushiki Kaisha Sumitomo Honsha, on 1 March 1937. It dissolved pursuant to an order 
from Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in November 1945. The preferred terms for its sub-
sidiaries and affiliates were renkei gaisha or renkei jigyō. See, for example, President Okahashi’s speech 
to the bank’s managers, November 1941, quoted in Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, pp. 364–365. Okahashi 
also referred to the other companies as “Sumitomo kakujigyō.” For discussions of developments involv-
ing Sumitomo-affiliated enterprises, see also ibid., pp. 170–172 (Meiji period); pp. 242–246, (Taishō 
period); and pp. 355–366 (1932–1945). “The term renkei gaisha is unique to Sumitomo,” the bank’s 
historians write. “It is applied to companies that were in a direct line” and were so designated by the 
Sumitomo Honsha (the central holding company), depending upon such things as the importance of 
the business and the percent of ownership interest held by the Honsha. Ibid., p. 357.
89 Fuji Ginkō 1980, pp. 188–190.
90 Ibid., pp. 190–192.
91 Ibid., p. 213.
92 Ibid., pp. 179–181.
93 Ibid., p. 185.
94 Daiichi Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, p. 252.
95 Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo 1976, pp. 175–177. These numbers of ordinary banks are as of 31 December 
of each year. Mitsubishi historians provide a nice précis of the history of the number of ordinary banks. 
Many small banks were established in late nineteenth century, and by the end of 1901 the number had 
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reached 1,867, the peak. Dissolutions and bankruptcies reduced that number over the next decade-and-
a-half, then, in response to changes in the structure of the economy, increased demand for credit called 
for larger banking institutions, giving banks incentive to merge. In 1920, the government simplified the 
procedures that merging banks had to take. After the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, the government 
actively began to encourage bank mergers, and in the Banking Law of 1928, it raised the minimum 
capitalization standards, resulting in an acceleration of the process of consolidation (233 banks merged 
in 1928 alone). Until the late 1930s, the primary objectives of the government’s consolidation policy 
were to protect depositors and to assist weak banks out of difficulty. As war dragged on, mobilization of 
an ever increasing volume of funds became the goal. Policymakers came to believe that mergers of large 
institutions were also necessary. Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), pp. 301–302.
96 As it turned out, the Dai-Hyaku Bank merged with Mitsubishi Bank in a transaction announced the 
same day as the Mitsui-Dai-Ichi merger, 28 December 1942. Shōwa Bank’s branches were taken over 
by the enlarged Mitsubishi. The idea of a merger between Dai-Ichi and Mitsui first came up after the 
panic of 1890. Nakamigawa Hikojirō suggested it, but the opposition of Shibusawa Eiichi and Mitsui 
Hachiroemon, among others, killed the discussion. Mitsui President Mandai Junshirō proposed it again 
in June 1938, through Yūki Toyotarō, but former Dai-Ichi presidents Sasaki and Ishii were against the 
idea. They thought a three-party merger including Mitsubishi might be worth considering, but a com-
bination with Mitsui alone, in their opinion, was not in the best interest of the bank. Daiichi Ginkō shi 
1957, vol. 2, p. 316.
97 The wording is “iwayuru zaibatsu de nai yūshū ginkō” いわゆる財閥でない優秀銀行. Mitsui 
Ginkō 1957, pp. 277–278.
98 The account of the merger is in ibid., pp. 277–285. The merger contract is reproduced on pp. 
285–288. Akashi ornamented his speech (quoted also in Daiichi Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, p. 243) with 
catchwords of the day such as ichioku isshin 一億一心 and daitōa sensō hisshō 大東亜戦争必勝. 
Others saw the principal benefit of the merger in terms of getting rid of (seisan) zaibatsu connections. 
Shibusawa Keizō 澁澤敬三 was brought in by Yūki and Mandai to be the intermediary between Mitsui 
and Dai-Ichi. Akashi had personally favored a merger since Mandai Junshirō suggested it five years 
earlier, but it was helpful to have the assistance of the grandson of Dai-Ichi’s founder in smoothing the 
way with Dai-Ichi’s board. Shibusawa was influential in his own right, as deputy governor of the Bank 
of Japan; he would become governor in 1944. Akashi Teruo, incidentally, was a son-in-law of Shibusawa 
Eiichi.
99 The fundamental principles of a company, codified, are called shaze or, in the case of a bank, kōze.
100 Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 295.
101 Ibid., pp. 295–296.
102 Daiichi Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, p. 317.
103 Tashiro continues, “That was a time when the aggregation of huge amounts of funds was necessary 
to supply funding for war supply production, and when management efficiency was strongly demanded 
in anticipation of even greater stringencies in personnel and materials. From 1942, especially, reorga-
nization of financial institutions for wartime purposes progressed rapidly, and the ordinary banks were 
mobilized directly for war objectives through the Decree on the Financial Control Association and 
the Decree on Financial Industry Adjustment. We acted under the direction of the National Financial 
Control Association.” There were, that is to say, extenuating circumstances, and the bank’s actions were 
not entirely voluntary, but the main point is that bank did cooperate with the war goals. Ibid., vol. 2, 
pp. 342–343.
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104 Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo 1976, p. 193. Regarding Asakura: The bank’s editorial committee, formed 
of a managing director and four department chiefs in 1973, decided that they wanted to produce a 
history that would be enjoyable for customers and other outsiders to read. They engaged the Japan 
Management History Research Institute to do the job, and turned the task of composition over to 
Asakura and Sugiyama Kazuo 杉山和雄. For reasons of health, Professor Sugiyama ended up contrib-
uting only the first of the nine chapters of the book, on the Edo period origins of the Mitsui business 
and the early Meiji period, to about 1890. Professor Asakura was sole author of the rest. He brought to 
the task the experience of having authored one of the standard surveys of modern Japanese financial his-
tory, and professional banking background, as well as a doctorate in economics. His banking experience 
was not at Mitsui, but in the Bank of Japan. Conceivably that made it easier for him to reach toward 
objectivity, or to maintain a scholarly distance toward his subject, than it had been for the earlier house 
historians, who were, after all, regular employees of the organization about which they were writing. He 
also benefited from the passage of time; writing in the mid-seventies, he enjoyed a different perspective 
from his predecessors of the mid-fifties, making it easier to eliminate detail in some passages and to see 
where it would be useful to fill in background in certain others. (This author’s survey history is (Shinpen) 
Nihon kin’yū shi (Asakura 1988).)
105 Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo 1976, pp. 191–192.
106 The quotations are from Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970), pp. 304 and 305. The account of the 
merger, which includes many excerpts of documents, is pp. 301–333.
107 Katō has earlier been referred to as chairman. Effective 1 April 1943, the title of the chief executive 
officer of Mitsubishi Bank changed from chairman (kaichō 会長) to president (tōdori 頭取). Mitsui 
and Yasuda had made similar changes earlier, when traditions of having family members in the top spot 
were ended. To the present day, bank presidents are called shachō 社長 at some institutions, tōdori at 
others. At most banks today, the effective chief executive is the officer in this position, and the chairman 
of the board of directors (kaichō) is a retired president who is not active in everyday management.
108 Fuji Ginkō 1980, p. 194.
109 Ibid., pp. 194–196.
110 Searches of the Harvard University and Columbia University libraries for corporate histories pub-
lished by the leading U.S. banks came up empty. Allan Nevins wrote a fairly short (156 pages) spon-
sored book, History of the Bank of New York and Trust Company, 1784 to 1934, privately printed and 
“issued by the Bank of New York & Trust Company on the occasion of the one hundred and fiftieth 
anniversary of its founding” in 1934. Apparently no major U.S. bank has published anything more than 
a brochure or pamphlet on its own history since then. As for quarterly and annual reports, we might 
think of them as “current history” or “short-term history,” akin to journalistic reportage, but informed 
by a readily identifiable pecuniary interest.
111 Daiichi Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, pp. 187, 190, 244. “Earning assets” refers to loans and securities 
owned. Over the period from the second half of 1937 through the second half of 1941, absolute levels 
of semiannual profits held fairly steady and indeed rose slightly (unadjusted for inflation), averaging 
¥5.6 million.
112 There is a table with selected asset figures and net profit figures for 1932–1935 in the text of Daiichi 
Ginkō shi 1957, vol. 2, p. 187, but for more details of assets, liabilities, and profits and losses, and a 
complete time series down to just before the date of publication, one must turn to the unpaginated 
appendices of this volume. This paragraph draws on the data much more than on the discussion by 
Tashiro.
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113 Mitsubishi Ginkō 1979, pp. 908–909. When the continuation of the Mitsubishi history was pub-
lished in 1970, the text of the 1954 Mitsubishi Ginkō shi was reprinted in a newly issued volume, but all 
appendices were omitted. Those were moved to the new second volume, Zoku Mitsubishi Ginkō shi.
114 Mitsui Ginkō 1957, part II, Gyōmu, pp. 371–458. Asakura, in Nihon Keieishi Kenkyūjo 1976.
115 Reported balance sheet and income statement figures are from Mitsui Ginkō 1957, pp. 724–725, 
726–727, 730, 734–735. None of these figures is adjusted for inflation. I calculated rates of return, 
rates of change, and averages. The fiscal year-end was changed to conform with government accounting 
practice effective 30 September 1943, so that fiscal year 1943 ended 31 March 1944, and so on.
116 Sanwa Ginkō shi 1954, pp. 79–81, 114–117, 153–156.
117 Sumitomo Ginkō 1979, pp. 302–303, 312. Treatment of profits is not detailed. I have relied on the 
table of important accounts, 1928–1945, ibid., appendix pp. 48–49. These figures are as reported, un-
adjusted for inflation. Sumitomo’s writers are unique among the historians of the six banks I looked at 
in providing concrete information about nominal growth rates, the GNP deflator, and real growth rates. 
They give us this data in a table that covers 1931 through 1944. The deflator ranged between negative 
12.6% in 1931 and plus 26.0% in 1940; from 1938 through 1944, it was always in double digits, and 
averaged 18.6%. Ibid., p. 295.
118 Yasuda Ginkō 1940, appendix, pp. 22–23. Yasuda does not break out the profit from each semian-
nual period from the profit carried over from the previous period. Accounting conventions were such 
that one cannot simply subtract the figure for the previous period from that for the current period to 
arrive at the net profit for the current period; many allocations from profits to reserve accounts, retire-
ment benefit accounts, and the like, were made from current period profit.
119 All six bank histories make frequent reference to the following laws and decrees that affected 
the banking industry: 10 September 1937 Emergency Funds Adjustment Law (implemented 27 
September, amended January and August 1938 and April 1939); 1 April 1938 National Mobilization 
Law (implemented 5 May); 18 October 1939 Decree on Price Controls (implemented 20 October); 19 
October 1940 Decree on Funds Management by Banks and Others; 8 December 1941 General Plan 
for Implementation of Wartime Emergency Funding Policy announced; 24 February 1942 Bank of 
Japan Law (implemented in stages on 20 March and 1 May); 18 April 1942 Decree on the Association 
for Control of Finance; 16 May 1942 Decree on Consolidation of Financial Enterprises; 2 August 
1943 System for Centralized Settlements of Domestic Exchange Transactions; 31 October 1943 War 
Supply Company Law (implemented 17 December); 18 January 1944 System of Designated Financial 
Institutions for War Supply Lending; 27 January 1945 Decree on War Supply Sufficiency Companies.
120 Gall et al. 1995. Authorized originally by the late spokesman of the bank, Alfred Herrhausen, and 
fully supported by Herrhausen’s successors, Lothar Gall and his co-authors Gerald D. Felman, Harold 
James, Carl-Ludwig Holffrerich, and Hans E. Büschgen can be categorized as authorized biographers, 
in terms of my conceit about biographies and autobiographies of artificial persons. They were inde-
pendent outsiders granted total access to the archives of the bank, not employees who had on some 
level a professional duty to protect the interests of shareholders, depositors, and customers. Tashiro and 
Asakura appear to have been in much the same position. As for naming names of clients, the Mitsui, 
Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo histories do list names of borrowers and sometimes of amounts of credit 
extended. Mostly (not surprisingly) those borrowers are companies in the same zaibatsu group. The 
Japanese corporate historians almost never elaborate on the specific purpose of a credit transaction or 
give details of what the borrowers were producing.
121 The scholars who wrote the Deutsche Bank history say they were not limited in what facts and 
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interpretations they presented. It deserves attention that while James, in “The Deutsche Bank and the 
Dictatorship 1933–1945” (pp. 277–356), does not spare Deutsche Bank from exposure of some embar-
rassing associations, practices, and policies in its past, neither does he take a sanctimonious judgmental 
stance—or at least he makes plain that choices are not simple. Concluding his section on “Banks and 
‘Non-Aryan’ Business,” for example, he writes, “[Deutsche Bank]’s participation in ‘Aryanization’ had 
brought a terrible moral burden. On the one hand, bank support undoubtedly helped some Jewish 
owners, especially in Germany in the pre-1938 borders (the Altreich): we shall see some occasions in 
occupied Europe when bank action was much more brutal. Without bank brokerage of property sales, 
it would have been more difficult for the victims of National Socialist persecution to rescue even the 
very meagre share that state regulations allowed them to retain and transfer out of Germany. On the 
other hand, in making these deals, the bank was not only engaged in a relatively well-earning commis-
sion business, but also facilitating the state’s realization of its political, racially motivated, objectives. In 
this way, banks were being pushed into the subservient role which the ideological fanatics of the new 
movement had demanded as early as 1933. An action which in individual cases . . . may appear to have 
been motivated by a genuine sympathy for former business partners, in its cumulative effect undoubt-
edly helped to undermine the principles of property and morality” (pp. 307–308). This kind of explicit 
reflection on moral nuances and the consequences of bank actions is missing from the Japanese bank 
histories.
122 Ienaga 1985 (2002), pp. i-ii.
123 Maruyama 1969, p. 125.
124 Rohlen 1974, p. 48; I have substituted the word “bank” for Rohlen’s fictional name “Uedagin.” For 
an example of a senior manager’s pronouncement on continuity, see the introduction by the president 
of the bank, Sako Seiji 迫静二, to Fuji Ginkō 70–nen shi (Fuji Ginkō 1952): “From the perspective of 
the social mission or the essential character of a bank, what we seek, of course, is to go on forever, and 
seventy years is not at all a long time. Yet at the same time when we quietly reflect on our past, we can-
not but feel boundless profound emotion at the vicissitudes in our country’s fortunes and at the growth 
and development of our own bank during these years.” The phrase “essential character” (honshitsuteki 
seikaku 本質的性格) might also be rendered “essential personality,” if we grant that a corporate entity 
can have a personality.
125 Satō Kiichirō 佐藤喜一郎, in Mitsui Ginkō 1957, p. 1.
126 “Atogaki,” Fuji Ginkō 1980 (unpaginated). The bank historians elaborate further on their principles 
of selection: “We have focused on the high and low points of the history of a hundred years, and oc-
casionally have placed emphasis on explaining in detail certain actions and the thinking or intentions 
behind them. To make this possible, we have omitted broad ranging descriptions of the bank’s organiza-
tion and structure and statistical explanations of the bank’s financial performance and condition. We 
have limited commentary on general domestic and international economic trends to what is relevant 
to and understanding of our bank.” President Matsuzawa Takuji 松沢卓二, in his “Kankō no kotoba,” 
declared, “The meaning of looking back at history is that it gives us a context for reflecting deeply on 
what is said to us today. On the occasion when we commemorate our hundredth anniversary, we have a 
responsibility to convey to future generations a history that properly understands the accomplishments 
and the lives of the people who built our bank—a history that becomes more complete with the pas-
sage of the eras. . . . The reason why we have compiled this new history covering the entire hundred-
year period of our Bank’s history, even though we had already published sixty-year, seventy-year, and 
eighty-year histories, is that we believe that in this time of great change, we need to examine closely and 
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understand the past course of our bank by looking at the whole of the past century, and to refresh our 
preparedness to inherit this past and go forward.”
127 Katō Takeo, “On the Occasion of Publication,” Mitsubishi Ginkō shi 1954 (1970). President Chigira 
Sōzaburō 千金良宗三郎, in his introduction to this work, noted, “History is a precious thing. If we do 
not know the history of our house, we cannot hope for the expansion of our house. That is so for na-
tions, and it is the same for banking corporations. . . . Now, at a time when our nation is reconstructing, 
. . . we feel deeply our serious responsibility to contribute to a still higher level of prosperity. On this 
occasion, we present a guide to our future course, in the form of instructive materials for reflection on 
the past developments of our bank and the record of the hard fight of our predecessors.”
128 Conversely, clients may avoid doing business with someone with a questionable past. Lawrence 
Cohn, a financial analyst at Ryan, Beck & Company, expressed this in commenting on alleged misuse 
of unclaimed funds by Bankers Trust employees in the 1990s: “Financial institutions face extraordinary 
risks when they plead guilty to a felony. Lots of customers won’t do business with convicted felons.” 
Timothy L. O’Brien, “Bankers Trust Investigation Narrows Focus,” The New York Times, 13 March 
1999, p. C1.
129 Sumitomo Ginkō 1998 might exemplify a new pattern. The body of the text of that book spreads 
over 671 pages, exclusive of nearly 200 pages of appendices. While 469 pages are devoted to the postwar 
years, the period 1931–1945 is covered in just 41 pages. Fewer individual bankers’ names and far fewer 
quotations of executives’ wartime statements appear in this 1998 account than in the eighty-year history 
published in 1979.
要旨
営業の観点から見た日本の民間銀行：
1931年から1945年までの経営史の一考察
ジェームズ・Ｃ・バクスター
本稿では満州事変から太平洋戦争終戦にかけて日本経済にお
ける大手民間銀行の活動とそれらが果たした役割を再検討す
る。先行研究の大多数は、国家政策若しくは大蔵省や日本銀行
の指導、また1937年日中戦争が勃発して以来段々と厳しくなっ
た経済統制政策を重視してきた。それらの研究とは対照的に、
ここでは民間銀行自体の方針と活動、なかでも大手銀行の資金
調達活動、利益を得ることを目的とした資金運用活動に焦点を
あてる。具体的には三和・住友・第一・三井・三菱・安田とい
った戦前のいわゆる六大銀行が創立記念刊行物として発行した
銀行史をもとに、民間銀行の経営者の発言と営業方針を分析す
る。彼らは健全な金融機関の構築と安全な営業を目指していた
し、企業が繁栄できる経済環境を望んでいたと本稿は論じる。
政治情勢の変遷や経済統制の強化のなか、日本の民間銀行家は
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経済環境や規則の変更に従ってその行動を順応させ、時には軍
事拡張に関連する営業拡張の機会を積極的に掴んで活用した。
当時流行していた愛国主義、国家主義を叫ぶ声は銀行業界内に
もあった。しかし同時期に、民間銀行の高幹部何人かは、経済
統制に対して疑問を表している。彼らは、統制制度のさまざま
な方針や規則は健全なる金融業界の養成と維持を損害する恐れ
があり、貸付業務においての銀行経営陣の裁量権削減は望まし
くないとしていた。結果的には、民間銀行家は時勢に合わせ、
厳しい状況のなかで日和見的に「善処する」経営方針を取り、
国家の戦争作戦の実行を援助することとなる。
